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Preface/Vorwort 
 
Friedenskonsolidierung nach Gewaltkonflikten in schwachen oder transfor-
mierenden Staaten schließt den verantwortungsvollen Umgang mit den mili-
tärischen Hinterlassenschaften kriegerischer Auseinandersetzungen ein. 
Dies betrifft naturgemäß in erster Linie die ehemaligen Kämpfer, deren De-
mobilisierung, Entwaffnung, soziale und psycho-soziale Reintegration in 
die Gesellschaft. Während die politische Aufmerksamkeit, auch der interna-
tionalen Gemeinschaft, sich auf die Beilegung von Gewaltkonflikten bzw. 
den wirtschaftlichen und politischen Neuaufbau konzentriert, erfährt das 
„menschliche Treibgut“ der Gewaltkonflikte nur selten vergleichbare Zu-
wendung. Dabei ist die Eröffnung ziviler Lebensperspektiven gerade für die 
ehemaligen Kämpfer eine unverzichtbare Voraussetzung, um durch Krieg 
und Zerstörung geprägte Gewaltkulturen nachhaltig zu überwinden. Die Be-
reitwilligkeit zur Entwaffnung der ehemaligen Kämpfer ist ohne deren Zu-
versicht, ihre Lebensinteressen künftig gewaltfrei verwirklichen zu können, 
kaum zu erwarten. Wird diese Aufgabe unterschätzt, bleibt die Saat für die 
Rückkehr von Gewaltkonflikten erhalten, der Frieden fragil. Tobias Pietz, 
Absolvent des vom Kooperationsverbund Friedensforschung und Sicher-
heitspolitik im Jahre 2002/2003 durchgeführten Postgraduiertenstudiengan-
ges „Master of Peace and Security Studies – M.P.S.“ der Universität Ham-
burg in Kooperation mit dem Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicher-
heitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH), hat diesen Zusammenhang 
am Beispiel Bosnien-Herzegowinas untersucht. Beim nachfolgenden Text 
handelt es sich um eine bearbeitete Fassung seiner Masterarbeit, die am 
Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Kooperationspartner im 
Studiengang M.P.S., betreut wurde. 
 
Hans J. Gießmann 
Vorsitzender des Gemeinsamen Ausschusses M.P.S. der Universität 
Hamburg und des IFSH 
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Druže, bilo je lakše sve    Everything was easier, my friend  
Mi u rovu, oni u rovu, tu na puškomet  We in a trench, they in a trench, all on a 
shootout 
Sjećaš li se druže, da ne bi izdali  Do you remember, my friend? So I’m not 
uncovering secrets 
Mi smo zadnji metak za sebe čuvali  Do you remember us saving the last bullets for 
ourselves? 
 
Druže, dok sam se budio  As I was awakening, my friend   
Ukrali su moju mladost, moje ludilo  They stole my youth, my craziness 
Dobre su kafane, dobro se napušit'  The bars were great, smoking up was easy 
Dobri ljudi vole priču što priča gubitnik   Good people like stories told by losers  
 
Korak preko ograde  Jumping over the fence…  
Je l' to druže jedino što časno je Is that the only honorable way, my friend? 
Zar za nas stare ratnike   Don’t we old soldiers  
Počasna salva da ne odjekne Deserve a soldier’s homecoming march?  
 
   
 
Homecome March - Bosnian Song by Zabranjeno pusenje 
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1. Introduction 
 
Almost eight years after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
country is still struggling with social and economic problems. Of the pre-
war population of about 4.6 million only 3.8 remained (HDR 2002, p.36). 
Many Bosnians are still refugees or internally displaced, and about 258,000 
inhabitants died in the four years of violent conflict between the three 
belligerent armies (Keane 2002, p.69). It is difficult to determine how many 
persons became involved in this conflict as regular soldiers, paramilitary 
combatants or just “weekend fighters”—a terrible term for groups of people 
recruited for some of the worst atrocities in this war. Estimates hold the 
numbers of combatants in BiH during the war as up to 425,000 or even 
higher (World Bank Project Appraisal Document for PELRP, May 2002, 
p.3). After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, many of these were 
discharged hastily. They posed an immediate threat to the fragile peace in 
the country by being unemployed, often traumatized and still with weapons 
in sight. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former 
combatants therefore constituted one of the most crucial issues in post-war 
Bosnia. 
 
The intention of this paper is to shed light on the process of DDR in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. It will deliver a critical analysis of the shortcomings and 
achievements of this process from 1995 to today. It will include analysis of 
the provisions of the DPA for DDR, but to a greater extent, it will offer an 
assessment of the success and overall feasibility of reintegration projects for 
demobilized soldiers in Bosnia. Because almost all the measures and 
activities in regard to DDR in BiH were undertaken by the World Bank and 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM), an evaluation of the 
three main projects of these organizations will be in the center of this 
document. The aim is to come up with conclusions on lessons learned in the 
design and implementation of these projects. The results can provide 
recommendations for future activities in BiH but also in other post-conflict 
settings where DDR activities are relevant. It may also allow conclusions on 
the overall prospects for theoretical approaches to DDR in their practical 
application. 
 
Besides classical research and the analysis of the respective DDR projects’ 
reports, the study relies greatly on interviews with some of the main 
national and international actors dealing with these issues in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The interviews were conducted during field trips by Andreas 
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Heinemann-Grüder to Sarajevo in March 2003 and by the author to Banja 
Luka in May of the same year. The author conducted semi-structured 
interviews; sample questions and the list of interviewees are provided in the 
appendix of this paper. 
 
The first chapter of this study will highlight some of the main issues in the 
debate on DDR today. It will also provide a baseline on what DDR 
activities should accomplish, which can enable a better understanding of the 
shortcomings and achievements of the projects evaluated in chapter four. 
The following part of this report will discuss the setting in which the DDR 
programmes have taken place in Bosnia. For that reason, the constraints of 
the DPA, the economy and the society of BiH will be considered. In 
addition, the path of the reduction of the armed forces which set the stage 
for reintegration activities will be described. The main part of this paper is 
chapter four, where an evaluation of the three major demobilization and 
reintegration projects will be carried out. Finally, a summary will present 
the results and lessons learned of DDR activities in BiH and will direct a 
few policy recommendations for future interventions. 
 
 
2.  Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Issues and 
Problems to Address 
 
“In the civil conflicts of the post-cold-war era, a process of 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has repeatedly 
proved to be vital to stabilizing a post-conflict-situation; to 
reducing the likelihood of renewed violence, either because of 
relapse into war or outbreaks of banditry; and to facilitating a 
society’s transition from conflict to normalcy and development.” 
    UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to reflect upon general issues of DDR and the 
design and implementation of DDR programmes in post-conflict settings. It 
draws on lessons learned and guidelines for DDR by international 
organizations like the World Bank, UN and ILO, who are frequently 
involved in DDR processes. The evaluation of the three major DDR 
activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in chapter four will be undertaken with 
this chapter as a background. 
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Definitions: 
Disarmament “is the collection, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and 
often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of 
responsible arms management programmes. 
 
Demobilization is the process by which armed forces (government and/or 
opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband, as 
part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Typically, 
demobilization involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, 
administration and discharge of former combatants, who may receive some 
form of compensation and other assistance to encourage their transition to 
civilian life. 
 
Reintegration programmes are assistance measures provided to former 
combatants that would increase the potential for their and their families’ 
economic and social reintegration into civil society. Reintegration 
programmes could include cash assistance or compensation in kind, as well 
as vocational training and income-generating activities.” 
UN DDR Guidelines 1999  
 
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants have 
become an issue with growing importance in international relations. After 
the end of the cold war, the international community became more and 
more active in countries that have been torn apart by civil wars and ethnic 
conflicts. In 2000, the UN Secretary General issued a report on “The Role 
of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration”, which stresses the importance of demobilization and 
reintegration in peace-building (Kingma 2001, p.13). Disarmament and 
demobilization is seen as a crucial issue in countries with a high number of 
small arms and light weapons circulating, and with not only soldiers but 
also civilians being involved in the fighting.  
 
Because of the diversity of actors involved in DDR and because of its 
overlapping nature in general, integrated planning mechanisms have to be 
set up as early as possible. Therefore an inter-agency multidisciplinary 
planning committee should be established to coordinate the various 
activities of the UN, NGOs and other organizations (UN DDR Guidelines 
1999, pp.5-8). 
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Disarmament has become an essential precondition for the consolidation of 
peace and stability. Experiences have shown that disarmament has no long-
term benefits if it is not accompanied by demobilization and reintegration of 
ex-soldiers into civil society through alternative and sustainable 
employment as well as the socio-economic development of the country as a 
whole (UN DDR Guidelines 1999, p.1).  
 
Reintegration activities have to take into account the different needs of ex-
combatants. The needs will vary according to their culture, gender, the side 
in the conflict they represented, and the functions they were performing as 
soldiers. Questions to identify their needs could include whether or not they 
served voluntarily, took part in combat, and how they were accepted by 
their communities when returning. It is important to answer these questions 
to establish the criteria for a reintegration programme (Specht 2000, p.5). 
An assessment of labor market opportunities is vital, too, in order to design 
profiles for training and education for ex-combatants to provide them with 
matching opportunities. Vulnerable groups such as female, disabled and 
child soldiers should receive special consideration in the design of DDR 
programmes. Female soldiers’ needs are often left out of DDR programmes 
because they’re not visible in the aftermath of the conflict. Efforts often 
focus on “channeling male aggression into productive activities” (Specht 
2000, p.5) which neglects the special issues and problems female soldiers 
face. In addition, demobilized soldiers, women or men, have a social impact 
on their home communities, their families and gender relations in general, 
which is seldom considered in DDR programmes (Specht 2000, p.5). 
 
Employment is the entry point to social, cultural, psychological and 
economic reintegration for demobilized soldiers. In a scattered and war-torn 
economy ex-soldiers join the often large group of other job-seekers. In this 
environment, the formal employment options are limited. The labor market 
has changed completely compared to pre-war settings with industries and 
key-enterprises closed and destroyed. Training and small enterprise 
development are seen as key areas for development and employment 
creation, but the starting point for every DDR activity is an initial rapid 
labor market assessment (Specht 2000, p.6). Though vocational training 
courses are useful for ex-soldiers, special courses for ex-soldiers should be 
avoided. Involvement in training courses can itself be a first step for social 
integration. This approach to mainstream assistance to all war-affected 
people is seen as being more efficient. Experiences show that DDR is best 
dealt with within the broader rehabilitation and development assistance for a 
country (Kingma 2001, p.7). 
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The DDR activity itself should try to build and rely on national providers 
and structures, rather than on international organizations. By this, the DDR 
programme can serve sustainability when national organizations stay in 
existence and continue service after the end of the internationally funded 
programme (Specht 2000, p.17). Every programme should also be 
integrated with other national or regional training and employment 
programmes to have a multiplying effect on the whole target community. 
 
The social consequences of war on all groups of the society are dramatic; 
more and more civilians are involved either as victims or as perpetrators. 
The UN and other development organizations have set up trauma healing 
programmes which often failed due to the fact that notions such as “trauma” 
and “healing” are strongly driven by culture (Specht 2000, p.9). 
Psychosocial aspects have not been adequately dealt with in the context of 
demobilization. Thus far, external agencies have paid limited attention to 
this issue in DDR activities (Kingma 2001, p.37). There is no doubt that 
war-experiences traumatize a large number of people in a way that 
successful reintegration is endangered. Not only are traumatized people 
often not able to start a job search, get employed and maintain that 
employment, but in the case of demobilized soldiers, traumata can pose a 
constant risk of returning to violence. With weapons still at hand and no 
economic or social perspective for the future, ex-soldiers can go back to the 
only “job” they know (Interview, G. Day 20 May 2003).  
 
Therefore, reconciliation between ex-combatants and civil society, which 
should be pursued through public relations campaigns in rural and urban 
areas, is also needed (UN DDR Guidelines, pp.5-8). 
 
DDR programmes are often developed and formulated too late, when the 
demobilization has already started. Often military and paramilitary units 
start to disintegrate immediately after the signing of a peace agreement. 
International organizations have to be prepared at an early stage. It is 
important to make sure that DDR regulations are already integrated in the 
peace talks. Lessons from other DDR processes show that Government and 
other key players are not prepared for sudden demobilization and 
reintegration activities. This can lead to a delay in the process that often 
causes lack of funds or ad-hoc decision making which can harm the whole 
reintegration effort (UN DDR Guidelines 1999, p.15). 
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3. Background  
 
To be able to evaluate the achievements and shortcomings of DDR 
programmes, one has to consider some other factors that influence any 
project implementation. In the case of DDR in Bosnia, there are three issues 
which are important to highlight: The constraints of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement; the situation of the Bosnian economy and society during the 
project implementations; and the political decisions and measurements 
regarding the demobilization of soldiers and restructuring of the armed 
forces up until today, and the potential ones in the future. 
 
3.1 Dayton Reconsidered  
 
The Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) or General Framework Agreement was 
signed between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in November 1995. The agreement was 
pushed forward by an American negotiation team under Richard Holbrooke 
and was meant first and foremost “to end a war” (Holbrooke 1998). It 
consists of a framework text of 11 articles and 11 annexes, with the annexes 
regulating the substance matters of the agreement (for example military 
aspects, regional stabilization, inter-entity boundary, election, constitution, 
refugees, etc.). 
 
The DPA was an ambiguous agreement regarding the ethnic configuration 
and dimension of the future state of Bosnia (Ehrke 2003, p.16). Though 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was officially maintained as a unitary state the most 
important state functions and responsibilities were delegated to the two 
“entities”, the Republica Srpska (RS) and the Bosniak-croatian Federation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH). These responsibilities included police, 
education and internal security. By strengthening the position of the entities, 
a conflict line was drawn which has been dominating all quarrels in BiH 
until today.  
 
The DPA enforced a 51-49% division between the Muslim-Croat 
Federation and the Serb Republic. Though an emphasis was put in the DPA 
on the facilitation of the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, 
until recently the numbers of returnees were quite low, cementing the war-
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based ethnic division of BiH even more. By the year 2001, there were still 
284,800 refugees in foreign countries (not counting the ones who solved 
their status in their host countries permanently), and 555,700 displaced 
people in both entities (HDR 2002, pp.72-74). Though the numbers of 
people returning are rising, minority returns—meaning ethnic minorities 
returning to an entity dominated by another ethnic group—are still low. The 
existing employment legislation in both entities discriminates minorities as 
they were by definition “on the other side”; priority in employment is given 
to demobilized soldiers, disabled veterans and families of fallen soldiers 
from their own ethnic group (HDR 2002, p.77). 
 
The clear divide of the two entities defined in terms of ethnicity has led to a 
fragmentation in the approach toward development issues like education, 
foreign investment, privatization, etc., because each entity’s governments 
have been pursuing their own economic and social agendas. This division 
has been perpetuated by nationalist parties, which won the first elections 
after the war, and now still control Bosnian politics on the state, entity and 
cantonal level. Nationalist politicians have used the fuzziness of the DPA 
and the weakness of its implementation by the international community to 
block any development to a functioning state and a closer cooperation of the 
entities in the first years after the DPA (Oschlies 2002, p.3). The evolving 
structures of BiH enabled a clientelistic and corrupt system where 
nationalist politicians remunerated themselves and their supporters.    
 
The political structure of BiH, as outlined in Annex IV of the DPA, is quite 
complex. It has a rotating presidency on the state level (with one 
representative of each of the three ethnic groups), a council of ministers and 
a bicameral assembly, “none of which exercise effective national authority 
over the two separate and different types of government at entity level” 
(Keane 2002, p.70). The two entities head disconnected non-sovereign 
states, the FBiH and the RS. The FBiH still has de facto two armed forces, 
two separate communities (a Croat and Bosniak one), and is governed by an 
appointed Entity Presidency and a bicameral parliament. The lower level is 
structured in cantons and municipal assemblies. The RS has an elected 
president, parliament and municipal assemblies. The structure of the FBiH 
has shown symptoms of over-bureaucratization that hinder effective policy 
implementation. But the most important and unique institution in the 
Bosnian state is the High Representative (HR) who can override every 
decision by any Bosnian institution. His powers were expanded in 1997 
after it proved that the first HR, Carl Bildt, had little effective power in his 
struggles with nationalist politicians in both entities (Numanovic 2002). The 
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second HR, Carlos Westendorp therefore gained the authority to impose 
laws and even remove disobedient politicians. Though nominated and held 
accountable by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and approved by 
the United Nations Security Council, his actual actions and decisions are 
quite independent and haven’t been corrected by any of the controlling 
institutions. The third HR, Wolfgang Petritsch made wide use of these 
powers by dismissing 64 politicians (who are not allowed to ever again take 
up a political position in BiH) and passing 246 laws. His successor Paddy 
Ashdown follows a similar approach. 
 
There has been growing criticism about the policy of the HR. Though many 
of his decisions were highly appreciated and secured the implementation of 
the DPA, the HR puts the Bosnian people under a de facto protectorate 
(Interview, E. Katana 15 May 2003). The strengthening of the position of 
the HR enforced a strange paradox with the Bosnian people being in charge 
of the input for the political process through elections, but not being 
responsible for the political output because it is controlled by the 
international community (Ehrke 2003, p.16). Researchers like David 
Chandler identify a quasi-colonial attitude of the international community 
that denies Bosnia democracy (Chandler 1999, p.5). Though this assessment 
is far too strong, the existing institutional setting in Bosnia when every 
decision of the Bosnian political representatives is at risk of being changed 
or dismissed nevertheless has a negative impact on the evolution of 
democratic structures. Together with the dependency on foreign aid, and 
with lingering attitudes from the socialist times, the feeling of not being in 
charge of your own fate has had an influence on the Bosnian society as a 
whole. Economic and social insecurity are increasing this problem, making 
it hard for every refugee, former combatant or just unemployed in both 
entities to overcome a passive attitude and the mindset that benefits will be 
provided by the state or the IC. It seems like the International Community 
wants to correct the mistakes it made in the aftermath of Dayton. As 
described above, the ethnic fragmentation and the evolving clientelistic 
system hindered a better coordination of both entities. A strong HR or the 
IC should have implemented Paddy Ashdowns agenda of today at a much 
earlier stage. But 8 years after the conflict, the Bosnian people react to some 
extent frustrated by not receiving the responsibilities for their own fate. 
 
In respect of the DDR-programs which will be examined in the following 
chapters, inter-entity-cooperation could have led to a better performance; 
moreover, a closer coordination of all development activities would have 
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been fruitful for Bosnian economy and society as a whole. Higher pressure 
of the IC on all parties in Bosnia at an earlier stage was very much needed. 
3.2 Phases of Demobilization and Reduction 
 
In 1995, at the end of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina a high percentage 
of its population, men and women, were serving in some kind of military or 
paramilitary organization. To assess the overall number of combatants is 
highly difficult due to the complexity of the civil war and the lack of 
records regarding the size of armies and combat units. Most of the operating 
armies in BiH between 1992 and 1995 were “ad hoc wartime formations” 
(King 2001, p.18). The World Bank speaks about 425,000 soldiers from 
Bosniak, Serb and Croat armies who have been demobilized over a period 
of six years since the signing of the DPA (World Bank Project Appraisal 
Document for PELRP, May 2002, p.3).  
 
Figures of Military Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 – 2003 
 
 Serb Muslim Croat Federation AF 
 IISS WDA IISS WDA IISS WDA IISS WDA 
1992/ 
1993 
67,000 67,000 30-50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000
1993/ 
1994 
80,000 110,000 60,000 - 50,000 60,000
1994/ 
1995 
80,000 110,000 110,000 - 50,000 50,000
1995/ 
1996 
75,000 - 92,000 35,000  50,000 49,000
1996/ 
1997 
85,000 35,000 92,000 90,000 50,000 50,000
1997/ 
1998 
30,000 45,700 40,000 90,000 16,000 50,000
1998/ 
1999 
- 45,700 - 90,000 - 20,000
1999/ 
2000 
- 45,700 - (31,363) - (13,673) 45,000
2000/ 
2001 
30,000 45,700 30,000 (19,345) 10,000 (8,500) 27,845
2001/ 
2002 
14,000 - (16,800) - (7,200) - 24,000 -
2002/ 
2003 
6,600 - (9,200) - (4,000) - 13,200 -
 
Sources:  The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – The Military Balance 
(Editions 1992/93 to 2002/03); The World Defence Almanac (WDA), Yearly Issue 
of The Military Technology (Editions 1992/93 to 2001/2002) 
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Another source estimates that 400,000 soldiers took part in the conflict of 
which 370,000 have been demobilized in the first five years after Dayton 
(King 2002, p.11). In contrast, the estimates of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) and the World Defence Almanac (WDA) are lower, 
counting 175,000 to 227,000 members of armed forces (See Chart 1). These 
calculations are nevertheless based on numbers from “real” armies that 
could be clearly identified, meaning that the additional group of 
paramilitaries or “weekend-fighters” is not included. 
 
Jeremy King suggests the distinction of three phases of demobilization of 
the armed forces in BiH (King 2002, p.11):  
 
• 1995/1996: Emergency demobilization following the DPA 
• 1997/1998: Intermediate professionalization of services 
• 1999/2000: Continuing professionalization process 
 
Though the term professionalization is misleading in regard to the evolving 
structures and capacities of the armed forces in Bosnia, and the phases are 
hard to differentiate, a distinction of phases nevertheless seems to be useful. 
 
The issue of demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration was handled 
badly after the signing of the DPA (Interview, G. Day 20 May 2003). 
Though it provided a strong military annex, no tasks were related to DDR. 
In Annex 1a, Article IV on the redeployment of forces, no clear 
measurement was agreed upon in regards to the reduction of forces. The 
only forces the conflict parties were obligated to demobilize were those 
“which cannot be accommodated in cantonment/barracks areas as provided 
in subparagraph (a) above. Demobilization shall consist of removing from 
the possession of these personnel all weapons, including individual weapons 
[…]. All personnel belonging to these forces shall be released from service 
and shall not engage in any further training or other military activities” 
(DPA 1a, IV, Phase 3, 1995). 
 
Though IFOR was meant to oversee and control the military agreements, 
this was not realized in regard to demilitarization and demobilization of 
combatants. Instead, the demobilization that took place after the signing of 
the DPA was rapid and bogus; often soldiers and combatants had just to 
turn in their uniforms and were sent home (Interview, G. Day 20 May 
2003). Jeremy King describes incidents three days after the DPA, when 
officers just disappeared and left confused soldiers of their units behind 
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(King 2001, p.18). The World Bank estimated that after 6 months—by June 
1996—almost 300,000 soldiers or combatants had left the armed forces: 
100,000 from Bosniak units, 45,000 from the Croat Defence Council 
(HVO) and 150,000 from the army of the RS (World Bank Technical 
Annex EDRP, 1996, p.1). This chaotic and rapid disintegration of the armed 
forces in Bosnia—though probably hard to prevent—hindered the process 
of registration of former combatants, which is the first important step for 
DDR. Instead of keeping all combatants in some way or the other under 
military hierarchy and in encampments until an international organization 
was able to register them for future integration assistance, no international 
organization assumed a leadership role for DDR. A clearer decision on the 
responsibilities and tasks of an organisation in that area should have been 
agreed upon in Dayton. To enable a significant DDR process in early post-
war Bosnia, the OHR as the only civilian power in the country should have 
had—once it was set up and working properly—the major responsibilities 
for overseeing DDR and facilitating DDR programming (Interview, G. Day 
20 May 2003). The war-scattered government of BiH was not able to 
approach DDR measures as state level structures or capacities did not exist. 
Therefore the only DDR game in town was the Emergency Demobilization 
and Reintegration Project (EDRP) of the World Bank, conducted from 1996 
to 1999. 
 
After a phase of training of the armed forces of the Federation by the US 
private military company MPRI—which, as a side effect let to some small 
reductions of the Federation Army—the next round of demobilization of 
forces in BiH occurred following the signing of the Madrid Agreement in 
1998. In this agreement, the two entities of BiH committed themselves to a 
further reduction of their armed forces by 30%. The reduction was 
implemented in two phases of 15% in the years 1999 and 2000. The overall 
objective of these reductions of the armed forces in BiH was to improve the 
situation in regards to budgetary savings of 30% for the defence budget, to 
increase security in the region and to strengthen mutual trust between both 
entities. In regard to the budgetary situation in both entities with costs of 
personnel making up to 80% of the budgets of the respective Ministries of 
Defence (MoD), a reduction was indispensable (Interview, R. Eaton 16 May 
2003). The total caseload of soldiers discharged in 1999 and 2000 was 
12,038 with 7,384 from the FBiH and 4,645 from the RS armed forces 
(Bodewig and Tomasovic 2002, p.4). The MoD did not demonstrate to be 
very helpful in steering the DDR process and was discharging soldiers 
without informing them on potential assistance for reintegration. The World 
Bank set up a special programme, the Pilot Emergency Labor 
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Redeployment Project (PELRP), to target these demobilized soldiers (for 
details see chapter on PELRP). 
 
The next round of reductions took place from 2002 on. This new period of 
downsizing the armed forces resulted again out of the threat of bankrupting 
the state of BiH because of the excessive spending of the entities’ MoDs. 
Defense spending in BiH amounted to 10% of the overall state budget 
(Interview, R. Eaton 16 May 2003). Facilitated by the OSCE and SFOR, the 
Joint Military Commission agreed on a further reduction in spring 2002. 
The Federation agreed on discharging 8,936 soldiers out of 22,496 in the 
VF (6,436 Bosniaks and 2,500 Croats). The RS accepted a reduction from 
8,292 to 6,600 (King 2002, p.12). After the World Bank decided not to 
expand the PELRP to this new round of demobilized soldiers, the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) agreed on expanding their 
reintegration activities. Though the MoDs were again not able to steer the 
DDR process, the IOM was partially able to register and inform the soldiers 
about potential assistance while they were still in their barracks. 
 
In 2003, a new phase of restructuring the armed forces in BiH was entered. 
This time, the reduction will not only happen due to budgetary necessities 
—which still prevail—but also for political reasons. The overall aim as 
formulated by the HR is the command and control of the armed forces of 
both entities at the state level (HR’s Decision 9 May 2003, Art.2, (4)). This 
decision and the politics evolving afterwards showed that the goal of the 
international community is to pressure the entities to build a joint army 
under a joint military command at the state level of BiH. A joint military in 
BiH could constitute a first step to an overall change of Bosnia’s state 
structures. Some members of the international community and also political 
and military officials of the Federation are even holding the opinion that the 
DPA is leaving enough space for the entity armies to be abolished and 
merged with a future army of BiH (Oslobodenje, 7 June 2003, p.3). It is 
expected that a new army would have only 9,600 to 12,000 soldiers, which 
would mean a serious reduction of about 50% or more of each entity’s 
armed forces. In the first calculations, the FBiH would have to discharge 
6,500 soldiers (1,900 from Croat and 4,600 from Bosniak units) resulting 
into 6,700 remaining soldiers (4,600 Bosniaks and 2,100 Croats). The RS 
would have to downsize its armed forces from the actual 6,600 to 2,900 
(Dnevni Avaz, 29 April 2003, p.8). There are forces in both entities’ armies 
and MoDs that clearly resent the reduction and the creation of a joint army 
in BiH (Interview, K. Owczarek 15 May 2003). Still, it is a clear that the 
pressure of the international community will be strong enough to foster the 
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restructuring, especially after the scandal of Bosnian weapons being 
smuggled to Iraq and the revelations of the spying of RS military and 
intelligence service against the FBiH and international organizations in BiH. 
Representatives of the MoD in the RS also declared that they will finally 
bow to international pressure because they do not want to be isolated 
(Interview, M. Cekic 14 May 2003). 
 
In regard to demobilization and reintegration, the new caseload of 
discharged soldiers will face some serious problems. So far, no international 
organization has agreed to provide assistance. Though the IOM will 
probably support future reintegration measures, it is struggling itself with 
decreased funding and interest from international donors (IOM TAFS 
Report, January 2003, p.12). The MoD in the RS will not be able to provide 
a severance payment to demobilized soldiers because no money is allocated 
to demobilization and reduction in the budget of the RS in 2003 (Interview, 
R. Brkic 14 May 2003).  
 
3.3 Economic and Social Situation in BiH 
 
Eight years after the signing of the DPA, Bosnian society and the economy 
still have not recovered fully from the impact of the war. Even without the 
war, BiH would have been faced with the challenges and problems of 
economic transition from socialism to an open market economy (World 
Bank Project Appraisal Document for PELRP, May 2002, p.2). But the war 
and the establishment of two (or de facto three) separate entities afterwards 
increased the burden and the challenges Bosnia has had to face (HDR 2002, 
p.17). The Human Development Report 2002 (HDR) of UNDP and the 
Economics Institute Sarajevo presented alarming figures: Bosnia-
Herzegovina appears to be in a worse position than almost any other 
country in the Southeast Europe Stability Pact (SESP) (HDR 2002, p.3). 
GDP per capita places BiH 61% below the EU average, 21% lower than 
world average and even 19% lower than the average of all countries in the 
SESP. Because of the legacy of the war and poor governance ever since one 
is tempted to assume that these results reflect the real situation in BiH 
today. 
 
But this is not accurate. There is no precise data available in BiH to allow 
clear-cut calculations. The HDR tries to correct some of the distortions to 
provide more realistic estimates. Unfortunately, there is also no sufficient 
data disaggregated by sex available for BiH. A fundamental problem for all 
measurements is that the number of people actually residing in BiH is not 
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known because there has not been a census after the war. Some people 
discuss the possibility that the actual population may be 10% lower than the 
official figures indicate (HDR 2002, p.4). All other statistics and 
measurements like the GDP, unemployment rates etc. depend on precise 
population figures. In addition, the impact of the grey economy and 
invisible money transfers from abroad can mean up to 20% more money 
being generated than the official GDP figures show. A 20% higher GDP 
spread over 10% lesser residents in BiH would change the general picture 
dramatically. This assumption would also explain why at a very high 
official unemployment rate of 28.1% only 19% of the population of Bosnia 
lives in relative poverty and no one in extreme poverty (HDR 2002, p.52).  
 
 
Economy 
 
The economic situation in BiH is far from being sufficient. The country is 
65% poorer than before the war (HDR 2002, p.47). 19.1% live below the 
fixed poverty line—set by the BiH government—of KM 1,843 per year with 
huge differences between the entities: In the Federation, about 15.6% of the 
population live below the poverty line while in the RS it is 24.8%. The GDP 
in BiH grew by 5.6% in 2001. This growth accounts only for the FBiH with 
7%. The RS economy did not expand much achieving only a 1.9% growth 
of the GDP (Pöschel 2002, pp.7-8). The HDR argues that the total GDP of 
BiH is probably higher due to cash flows from abroad of as much as 20% of 
the official GDP. The HDR calculates that around 300,000 BiH citizens 
found employment abroad and send money to Bosnia every month. In 
addition, small and micro companies often do not register the incomes of 
their employees, or they report the income to be at the minimum wage to 
reduce their social insurance obligations. Small and medium-sized 
companies lower their annual balance sheets in order to evade sales and 
profit tax. Last but not least, the grey market in BiH also generates income 
(HDR 2002, p.21). 
 
Industrial production shows a high discrepancy between the two entities. 
While FBiH grew by 12% in 2001, RS declined by 12%. In general, 
industrial production is lower than the pre-war-period though it is 
methodologically impossible to compare the pre-war situation to today 
because often pre-war industries were not resumed following the conflict 
(Pöschel 2002, p.8). 
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The deficit of the state budget in 2001 was US $ 1 billion, or one quarter of 
the GDP of BiH. The external debt of BiH had risen by 2000 to US $ 2.97 
billion which equals 69% of the GDP. The WB is the major creditor with 
US $ 1.26 billion. Debt service requirement for 2001 amounted to US $ 93 
million; for 2002-04 it will increase to around US $ 170 million per annum 
(Pöschel 2002, p.10).  
 
In the current state of the Bosnian economy, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
is seen as the only solution to revive it. So far, however, it hasn’t attracted 
much of it. Only KM 835 million of FDI came into BiH between 1994 and 
2001. A new law on FDI in 1999 didn’t create the hoped increase 
afterwards. Although some economic segments have become more 
attractive to FDI, investors in BiH face a labyrinth of formal and informal 
rules at the level of the state, the entities, the cantons and the municipalities, 
which are often contradictory or duplicative and create room for corruption 
(Pöschel 2002, p.15). Until now, BiH was able to cope with low FDI 
because of the high influx of international aid. Between 1996 and 1999 
donors invested around US $ 3.5 billion for reconstruction (HDR 2002, 
p.17). But now the flow of funds from international donors is decreasing. 
The government can provide public services to the population only thanks 
to this external support (Pöschel 2002, p.9). 
 
 
Employment and Unemployment 
 
Employment is a very difficult area of analysis in BiH. The HDR offers 
three different sets of figures (HDR 2002, pp.34-36): the official ones from 
employment bureaus and statistical offices, the estimates made by the 
Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) of the World Bank, UNDP 
and DFID, and calculations based on various official figures to estimate 
how many people are in informal jobs, which could be added into the 
calculation of the formal employment sector. The official figures in 1990 
showed 1,054,000 people in registered employment in BiH, 85% in industry 
and 15% in the public sector. By 2001, 633,860 people were registered in 
employment, 75% in industry and 25% in the public sector (not including 
armed forces and police which add around 60,000 more individuals to the 
public payroll). The number of employment in the public sector is even 
higher in the FBiH constituting about 30%. The number of people employed 
in the industry includes so called “wait-listed workers” who are not really 
employed in the companies any longer but kept registered for social 
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benefits. The overall number of unemployed people is officially, according 
to government sources at 421,198 which constitute an employment rate of 
about 28.1%.  
 
Estimates of the LSMS show that the official numbers are not realistic but 
distorted by different factors. Some self-employed are not registered to 
evade insurance payments. Also, employers evade these payments by not 
registering their employees. People on the “waiting list” who are formally 
employed but do little or no productive work inflate the employment lists. 
Estimates show that around 35% of registered workers are in economically 
unsustainable jobs.  Last but not least, the grey market is also a distorting 
factor.  
 
Many of those considered employed are not in secure and stable jobs but 
only have informal subsistence income generation with no labor or social 
rights. Still, the LSMS estimates increase the figure of people generating 
some kind of income to 920,000 altogether. Informal labor is mostly found 
in agriculture, construction and trade. The PRSP Team of BiH estimates 
that out of the overall number of 920,000 generating income, about 41% in 
the RS and 32% in the FBiH are unofficially employed or working in the 
informal economy (PRSP Development Strategy for the BiH Labor Market, 
December 2002, p.5). 
 
The LSMS comes to the estimation of an unemployment rate of about 
22.2% in BiH, with employment in the grey market is counted as being 
employed. This rate represents the percentage of the workforce not able to 
access any regular income generating activity. There are only slight 
differences between the RS with 23.3% and the FBiH with 21.6%. This 
would amount to 414,800 unemployed people in Bosnia in 2000. One third 
of these are demobilized soldiers according to their estimates, which would 
constitute about 138,000 unemployed ex-soldiers (HDR 2002, p.38).  
 
Accordingly, the traditional concept of employment is no longer an 
adequate measure for BiH because many individuals find themselves either 
with formal employers who pay only social and health insurances and are 
not providing any productive work for them or informal employers who 
provide them with work but no labor rights or social entitlements. The poor 
will pay the price for this distorted labor market and economy in the future 
if there is no major reform in that area soon. The only area, that the HDR 
sees for employment growth are small and medium enterprises, production 
and services and the financial institutions. 
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Another worrying result from the LSMS is the very high unemployment 
rate among young people. While only 9.7% of the persons at the age of 50-
60 and 13.4% of the ones at 25-49 are unemployed, 34.8% of the young 
people at the age of 19-24 are looking for a job. As a result, 14.3% of the 
young population between 15 and 25 years of age and 8.5% between 25 and 
29 left BiH between 1996 and early 2001, 92,000 altogether. 65% of young 
people in BiH today would leave if they had the opportunity to do so (HDR 
2002, p.49). 
 
 
Refugees and Displaced Persons 
 
There are still 613,700 refugees outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, but 328,900 
have resolved their status in the host country and are not potential returnees 
any longer. Since the signing of the DPA, 372,200 refugees have returned to 
BiH, most of them (92%) to the Federation. 84% of returnees to the RS 
were Serbs while 73% of returnees to the Federation were Bosniaks and 
20% Croats. The ethnic division of the country has not been reduced, as 
intended by the IC. Instead it has been cemented by this process, because 
ethnic groups return to “their” entity. Internally displaced people still 
constitute a big problem to both entities. Currently, there are 555,700 
displaced people in BiH, 283,900 in the Federation, 248,300 in the RS, and 
23,500 in the district of Brcko. All the displaced people in the Federation 
are Bosniaks or Croats, while in the RS they are exclusively Serb (HDR 
2002, p.73). 
 
 
Mental Illnesses 
 
Mental illnesses had increased as a direct consequence of the war, 
especially among more vulnerable groups, such as displaced persons, 
refugees, orphans, the elderly and demobilized soldiers. 15% of all people 
in BiH are estimated to suffer from traumas like PTSD, though rates vary by 
region or canton. Neurotic disorders and affective mood disorders account 
for 61% and 14% respectively. So far, there is no data available on the 
potential increase of murders and suicides due to these mental illnesses 
(HDR 2002, p. 57).   
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Political Responsibilities 
 
The political system of BiH has hindered economic progress (HDR 2002, 
p.6). The DPA was necessary to stop war but it split the country into de 
facto three entities which is still the major obstacle to economic 
development. The leading local players of nationalist parties try to limit the 
cooperation between the entities to a minimum. It is clear that constitutional 
structures established by DPA are not adequate but the negotiation of new 
rules would require more confidence and cooperation of all political leaders 
in BiH. 
 
The number of institutions implemented at the state level is increasing; the 
establishing of the central bank was a major step ahead politically for the 
Bosnian economy as it strengthened fiscal stability. But with political power 
shifting to the central level the public sector is coming under more financial 
pressure because it lacks a sound revenue basis as long as the Bosnian 
economy is not providing enough tax and costumes revenues. Cutting 
expenditures to reduce the deficit is not an option because there is no room 
for that kind of measurement. Two thirds of the budget of the FBiH goes to 
the military and war-disabled veterans. In the RS, 46% of public 
expenditures cover wages of the public sector. That doesn’t leave any room 
for public incentives to stimulate the economy (HDR 2002, p.25). 
 
Massive reconstruction aid by the IC has been to a large extent frittered 
away in ethnic politicking and the pursuit of personal and group interests. 
The politicians failed to create a viable state and provide the preconditions 
for human security and human development (HDR 2002, p.99). In addition, 
the public administration hinders the development of an economy based on 
smaller and highly competitive enterprises. With no resources, no credits, 
bureaucratic procedures and the high corruption it is practically impossible 
to start a business of your own. 
 
 
4. DDR Programmes of International Organizations in Bosnia 
 
As mentioned before, the DPA was not providing any concrete regulations 
on DDR in post-war Bosnia. Moreover, there was no leading international 
agency for this crucial process. A strategic holistic vision for demobilization 
and reintegration of former combatants was missing and led to a rather 
chaotic and rapid disintegration of most of the war’s military and 
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paramilitary groups as the Deputy High Representative of BiH, Graham 
Day stresses (Interview, G. Day 20 May 2003). The result of this scattered 
approach of the international community has been a continuing security risk 
especially for rural areas of BiH where former combatants are facing 
constant unemployment and weapons are still widely spread and available 
(Interview, J. Glazebrook 20 May 2003). The lack of adequate reintegration 
contributed to growing crime, violence towards returning minorities, 
smuggling of weapons and export of mercenaries to other global conflicts 
(King 2002, pp.10-11). Better results would have been possible with the 
OHR being in charge for coordinating DDR activities, assisted by OSCE 
and IFOR/SFOR (Interview, G. Day 20 May 2003). The post-war 
governments of BiH’s entities were—and to some extent still are—not able 
to steer demobilization and reintegration projects (King 2002, p.10). 
 
As a result, the international support for demobilization and reintegration 
after the war came almost exclusively from the World Bank and was 
channelled through its Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration 
Project (EDRP). Other international organizations and NGOs were dealing 
with these issues mostly as sub-contractors to the EDRP providing 
assistance for some of its activities. Because there is no data and only 
scattered information available on the rare national DDR projects 
implemented on the regional or cantonal level, no evaluation of these 
activities is possible.  
 
This chapter will provide an overview of the three main projects that were 
and are implemented in regard of DDR in Bosnia. It will discuss their 
design, implementation and output to finally deliver an assessment of the 
projects’ achievements, shortcomings and overall lessons learned.  
 
4.1 Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP) 
 
In response to a request by the government bodies of the FBiH in early 
1996, the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) 
designed an emergency project for demobilized soldiers in the FBiH and the 
RS. The overall objective of this programme was  
 
“to assist economic reintegration of displaced workers into the 
civilian workforce in order to reduce the burden on families, 
decrease dependency on eventual social assistance, and increase 
economic productivity. The primary target group is demobilized 
soldiers. Secondary target groups include refugees, war victims and 
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the disabled, widows and the general unemployed.” (World Bank 
Technical Annex EDRP, June 1996, p.3) 
 
In accordance with the DPA, the conflicting parties had agreed on a 
balanced reduction of forces in all three competing armies of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Of the estimated 400,000 soldiers in Bosnia in 1995, about 
370,000 soldiers were demobilized by the year 2000 (King 2002, p.11). At 
the start of the implementation of the EDRP, almost 50% of all soldiers of 
both entities had already been demobilized. The initial phase of this 
reduction emphasized on first demobilizing the soldiers who had the 
opportunity to return home and to their former employment, and those 
soldiers who could take up and complete an education that had been 
disrupted by the war (World Bank Technical Annex EDRP, June 1996, p.3). 
Originally, the EDRP was designed to establish employment through 
training and other activities for approximately 35,000 demobilized soldiers 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would have benefited about 8% of all 
demobilized soldiers. The expected costs amounted to US $20 million, with 
an average cost per trained and employed person of US $500. However, the 
money received and spent for project implementation was only US $8.5 
million (US $7.5 from IDA, a US $ 400,000 Dutch Grant, a US $ 300,000 
Swedish Grant and US $ 350,000 from USAID), with the FBiH receiving 
two thirds of these funds.  
 
The Project Implementation Units (PIU) in BiH stressed that the design of 
the project was based on experiences of the World Bank in other projects 
that addressed economic reintegration needs of ex-combatants such as in 
Palestine, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe. It also would relate to the Bank’s work 
in other transition economies in Central Eastern Europe, regarding the 
successful integration of displaced workers (Implementation Completion 
Report BiH EDRP, 2000, p.3). In addition, it draws on field work in BiH in 
February 1996 and other missions by the World Bank to BiH in the same 
year. The implementation of the EDRP in the FBiH started in 1996.While it 
took until early 1997 for the project to begin working in the RS. The reason 
for this was the political situation in the RS in 1996; a large number of 
nationalist Bosnian Serb leaders were opposing the IC and therefore 
hindering its interventions to some degree.  
 
Though it is acknowledged in the project report that both men and women 
were and are enlisted in the armed forces of both entities, there is no data 
available for the EDRP which has been disaggregated by sex. The special 
situation and needs of former female combatants in comparison to their 
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male counterparts is not the subject of a special targeting approach in the 
design of this project. Former staff members of the PIU that have been 
interviewed, perceived the group of beneficiaries as small and not 
identifiable—therefore, in their opinion, no special needs assessment was 
required (Interview, D. Vuckovic, 15 May 2003). An exception regarding 
this issue is the assistance provided by one of the subcontracted agencies in 
the EDRP, the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC). The 
ICMC established a school for secretarial education in the Canton Sarajevo, 
serving about 2,500 female ex-combatants (Interview, H. Valier, 13 May 
2003). This assistance was requested by the Bosniak Veterans Association 
and was driven by the high demand of the international organizations 
coming into Bosnia for secretarial and administrative staff. Therefore, the 
IC, though willing in some parts to break up traditional gender relations, 
was reinforcing to some extent the old division of labor with male 
demobilized soldiers getting the biggest share of the jobs in reconstruction 
(where most jobs were created in the aftermath of the war) and female 
demobilized soldiers becoming secretaries in the offices of the international 
organizations. 
 
 
Institutional Arrangements 
 
To facilitate the project, the WB established two Project Implementation 
Units (PIU). Both PIUs worked with so called extension agents (EA) to deal 
with demobilized soldiers in the regions directly. There were three 
extension agents covering three regions in the RS, while five dealt with five 
regions in the Federation. The extension agents were in charge of 
identifying the whereabouts of the ex-soldiers and supply them with 
relevant information on the project, mostly through announcements in 
newspapers for initial information workshops in the regions. The EAs 
reported monthly to the PIUs on the employment situation of the 
demobilized soldiers.  
 
The PIUs were established by the respective entity governments as 
autonomous and non-profit agencies. The staff of the PIUs received training 
through a team of consultants of the International Labor Affairs Bureau of 
the United States Department of Labor (USDoL). Based on experiences 
gained from projects designed for American veterans, manuals were 
adapted to the realities of Bosnia. In addition, the consultants from the 
USDoL managed the first period of the EDRP in FBiH, while the PIU of the 
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RS—due to the later start of the project—as receiving less training and 
oversight by the USDoL.  
 
The cooperation with the MoD and other government institutions was not 
very close in the aftermath of the war. Especially in regard of the selection 
of beneficiaries, a close cooperation with the MoD would have been useful 
(Interview, D. Vuckovic, 15 May 2003). 
 
It is important to mention that there have been major differences regarding 
the institutional set-up of the PIUs. The PIU in the Federation was only 
managing the EDRP. In the RS, an institution was established in charge of 
the implementation of the EDRP and other World Bank projects such as the 
Public Works and Employment Project (PWEP) and the Local Initiatives 
Project (LIP) (World Bank Project Appraisal Document for PELRP, May 
2002, p.23). This institute was called the Employment and Training 
Foundation (ETF). Therefore, not only a cross-referral took place in the RS, 
but also institutional memory was maintained because the ETF in Banja 
Luka—now renamed The Development and Employment Foundation 
(DEF)—is also implementing the World Bank’s follow-up project for 
demobilized soldiers, the PELRP. Instead of being closed at the end of 
implementation—as happened to the PIUs for all the World Bank projects 
in the FBiH, not only the ones implementing the EDRP—there was a 
continuation of infrastructure, experience and administrative staff in the RS 
(Interview, Z. Miovcic, 14 May 2003). Coordination of interventions in the 
FBiH was therefore more difficult in comparison to the RS. 
 
In addition, the ETF in the RS was working more autonomous from the 
consultants of the USDoL because it started implementation at a later time 
and with less support in the beginning of that process. This was seen as an 
asset for the staff of the RS’s PIU, because it allowed closer and more self-
responsible monitoring and access of all sites for the partners in the EDRP 
in the RS. Moreover, it enabled the PIU to apply the suggestions of the 
American consultants better to the reality of the RS by making these 
“simpler”. The suggestions were sometimes seen as being “too complex and 
therefore not applicable to reality” (Interview, Z. Miovcic, 14 May 2003). 
 
It is also important to point out that some municipalities in the RS were on 
“the black list” in the first years after the end of the war, meaning that there 
was no assistance provided in the framework of the EDRP. This happened 
due to political tensions between some of the factions in the RS and the IC.  
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Project Components 
 
The EDRP consisted of four designed project components: 
 
• Development of a Labor Market Information Data Base (LMI) 
• Counseling and Job-Finding Services 
• Education and Retraining Services 
• Management Assistance 
 
LMI: 
The objective of this component was to develop a LMI that would match 
the skills of the unemployed workers with the specific needs of the 
enterprises that are emerging, restarting or expanding. As a final goal, the 
LMI was to be installed in all central, regional and local employment 
institutes in both entities. The project provided the hardware for the LMI 
and contracted organizations to develop the software. A major concern in 
the beginning of implementation of this component was that it would not be 
possible to reach a consensus on uniformity in system design with each 
entity’s employment institutes (EI) at state and cantonal level representing 
Croat, Serb and Bosniak interests. Fortunately, a single system that every EI 
can use independently was agreed upon and developed. This LMI would 
allow—if political will existed—to exchange the same labor information 
and employment statistics of all regions of BiH. By now the LMI is 
installed in all employment bureaus in BiH—to what extent it is used 
couldn’t be clarified by Bosnian officials (Interview, Z. Miovcic 14 May 
2003). 
 
Counseling and Job-Finding:  
This component was established to develop the capacities of the EIs and 
also participating private companies to provide employment counselling and 
job search assistance to unemployed workers. There was also an effort to 
develop services for demobilized soldiers, refugees and others to work on 
PTSD related problems in the RS. Those problems can have an impact on 
the person’s ability to conduct an effective search for employment and in 
then maintaining a job. The service to address these problems in the RS 
assisted 229 persons (180 male, 49 female). A team of clinical 
psychologists provided them with advice and psycho-educational training 
(Sawjak 2000, p.2). The aim of this activity was to screen the participants 
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and assess their mental health in regard to trauma-related problems. 
Moreover, it was meant to raise the awareness on post-war mental problems 
in demobilized soldiers and Bosnian society as a whole and to stress the 
importance of follow-up activities (Sawjak 1999, pp.2, 22). The main result 
of this small activity was striking: 41% of the clients showed clear 
symptoms for PTSD which is clearly an obstacle for any kind of 
reintegration assistance (Sawjak 1999, p.10). Though the psychologists 
emphasized the importance to extent activities in this area, there were no 
additional projects provided. 
 
Job counselling services itself were also unknown to pre-war, socialist 
Yugoslavia. The EIs, which had a monopoly on job counselling after the 
war were not ready to provide efficient services like résumé writing, 
development of job-searching strategies and preparation for job interviews. 
Therefore, through the EDRP the EIs were not only sub-contracted for 
providing these services, but first received themselves capacity building 
activities. But this assistance did not proof to be sustainable. Without the 
financial support of the EDRP, the assistance was gone (Interview, Z. 
Miovcic, 14 May 2003). Still today, most of the EIs in Bosnia are perceived 
to be too bureaucratic and not very efficient in job counselling. Private 
companies and NGOs contracted for this component showed better 
performance ratings. The monitoring through the PIUs was quite strict, 
continuing the contract only if at least 25% of the assisted persons had 
found a job. 
 
Because of the aforementioned history of job counselling and the still 
existing bureaucratic structures in this area, this component was seen quite 
sceptically before implementation, especially considering the economic 
situation after the war. Therefore the actual performance of this component 
can be seen as sufficient. Out of 3,324 clients served by 35 contracts with 
different partners (2,643 in FBiH; 681 in RS), 912 were employed after 
receiving assistance (678 in FBiH; 234 in RS)—a placement rate of about 
28% (Implementation Completion Report BiH EDRP, 2000, p.8). Long 
term monitoring of the participants didn’t take place, the placement rate 
reflects only immediate job placements. It may be assumed that the impact 
of this component will be to some extent higher, but also the possibility of 
those being employed to lose their jobs exists, of course. All measurements 
of served persons, meaning the overall placement rate—in all 
components—was made only once, 120 days after the assistance, which 
resulted in a lack of information about the beneficiaries. A longer 
monitoring process would have provided more information on the project’s 
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performance and could have improved future measurements and activities 
for employment. 
 
 
Education and Retraining Services: 
This component was designed to finance sub-project contracts with 
appropriate providers for demand-driven education and retraining services 
primarily to demobilized soldiers. It could also include the provision of 
education and retraining resources to enterprises, which would then provide 
on-the-job-training to the unemployed. Moreover, education and training 
institutions were financed, which provided short-term retraining 
programmes. The contractors had to verify that there are reasonable 
expectations for an increased demand in the occupations they trained for. 
Contracts were only renewed after a certain, pre-negotiated placement rate 
of 80% of the trained demobilized soldiers had been achieved by the 
contractor. That means that training and education institutes were de facto 
responsible for getting the demobilized soldiers a job after the activity. 
When the PIU first published a request for contractors in this component, 
the feedback was quite surprisingly high. A lot of the jobs created were 
immediately related to the re-construction of the country. The conditions of 
the EDRP assistance were especially attractive to emerging enterprises, 
because they opened flexible and quick opportunities to hire employees, 
with the chance to pick only the ones, who had proven to have the needed 
expertise. The PIU has assessed that through these incentives “enterprises 
were able to provide services and increase production with appropriately 
trained personnel earlier than would otherwise have been the case” 
(Implementation Completion Report BiH EDRP, 2000, p.10). 
 
1,233 clients were served in this component (865 in FBiH, 368 in RS), of 
which 916 were employed. The number for on-the-job-training at the 
enterprises was significantly higher; through 497 signed contracts (307 in 
FBiH, 190 in RS), 18,766 persons were assisted with the result of 15,380 
being employed (10,794 in FBiH, 4,586 in RS).  
 
Though the outcome of this component was quite impressive, there had 
been some criticism. A lot of funded contractors provided labor intensive 
jobs in reconstruction, which were only reducing unemployment in the 
short-term instead of providing the needed transformation of the Bosnian 
economy away from big state owned industries and enterprises mainly 
working in the construction business to small and medium enterprises 
(SME) providing jobs in the service sector. Mainly this was due to the 
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overall economic situation in BiH at that time. With US $ 3.5 billion of 
reconstruction aid floating into Bosnia, it was easier for the PIUs to support 
employment in the area of reconstruction (HDR 2002, p.17). SME 
development was hindered by bureaucratic procedures and the lack of 
foreign direct investments or state incentives at that time. 
 
Most of the funded projects of the EDRP “did nothing to address the 
underlying psychological tensions and post-traumatic mental illness (King 
2002, p.11)”. The good approach of the PIU in the RS by integrating PTSD 
counselling into component 2 assisted only 229 persons—out of 23,000 
clients in the whole EDRP. With an assessed 41% of the demobilized 
soldiers taking part in PTSD counselling in the RS still suffering from 
PTSD, more services provided in that area are crucial to the success of such 
a project (Savjak 2000).  
 
Management Assistance: 
This component was funded to provide and finance technical assistance and 
training to the staff of both entities PIUs. As mentioned the cooperation 
partner was the International Labor Affairs Bureau of the USDoL. It 
assisted not only in the development of the institutional structures but also 
in developing procedures and controls, and contracts meeting IDA 
standards. In addition, the American consultants assisted in the development 
of manuals, using experiences gained from job counselling for American 
veterans. Also the LMI was a major entry point for USDoL assistance. 
Though the overall support was perceived to be quite helpful and efficient, 
some approaches were seen as being too complex and not applicable to 
Bosnian reality (Interview, Z. Miovcic, 14 May 2003).  
 
Most of the training of the consultants took place at an early stage of the 
project. The USDoL consultants spent a lot of their time and resources in 
the country before the PIUs in both entities were fully equipped and staffed. 
Because of this, greater technical assistance was not available at a later 
phase of the EDRP when it could have been an important contribution to 
better services by the PIUs. In particular, the extension agents (EA), and 
also other staff hired at a later time, did not receive the needed training in 
labor market and employment issues (Implementation Completion Report 
BiH EDRP, 2000, p.11). In the view of the PIUs’ staff, greater capacities 
could have been developed earlier to provide better services to the clients 
and monitor sub-contractors in a more efficient way. 
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In the RS, because of the late start and political reasons, even less training 
of staff was received, which nevertheless was perceived as giving the PIU 
more independence and accuracy in developing approaches that were more 
applicable in the RS (Interview, Z. Miovcic, 14 May 2003).   
 
 
Achievements 
 
The EDRP was successful in training and providing assistance to 23,323 
persons, mainly demobilized soldiers. 17,208 of these, or 74%, were 
employed. This high placement rate was achieved in an evolving society 
struggling with the remnants of war and socialist planned economy. The 
PIUs also stress the long-term gain of the EDRP for Bosnian society as a 
whole, with employed individuals improving their families’ economic 
situation, benefiting their communities through more consumption and 
payment of income taxes. In its implementation report, the PIUs stress that a 
similar project, paid by the Bosnian state, could have generated enough 
revenues to theoretically support the training of 30,000 demobilized soldiers 
on an annual basis, because each employed ex-soldier would generate 
income taxes and social payments to the state, while their households could 
strengthen consumption in general (Implementation Completion Report BiH 
EDRP, 2000, p.11). The training itself was much more efficient and cheaper 
than originally planned in the project’s design. Instead of US $20 million to 
train 35,000 demobilized soldiers, only US $8.5 million was provided by 
the IDA and other donors. Still, the PIUs managed to assist 23,000 clients. 
Thus, based on the original estimate of US $500 per trained person, the 
project was able to provide assistance at an average of US $352 per served 
individual (for training, subsidized employment, etc.). This was almost one 
third less than anticipated. 
 
The structure of the PIUs also proved to be very beneficial to the 
implementation process. This was especially the case in the RS, where 
continuation and cross-referral was guaranteed through the setting up of 
PIUs for all World Bank projects at the ETF. 
 
The EDRP also raised the awareness of companies that training for 
employees on the job is needed, and that trained employees are beneficial 
for their companies’ overall economic performance. In a country where 
structures from socialist planned economy still prevail, the project helped to 
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introduce new approaches for job counselling and to support private 
companies and state owned EIs to follow that new path. 
 
A very important achievement was also the close and successful 
cooperation of the entities’ PIUs at a time when contacts, cooperation and 
even communication between the former adversaries were almost 
completely prevented—one of the major constraints at the beginning of the 
project, for example, was the lack of a phone connection between the two 
entities. Apart from the already mentioned joint LMI, both PIUs met 
regularly, shared materials, experiences and other information, and also 
took part in common seminars and conferences. 
 
 
Shortcomings 
 
Though the PIUs have shown to be successful structures for the project, the 
EDRP with de facto three separate implementing agencies was clearly not 
the optimal organizational structure. It nonetheless, reflected the reality in 
BiH (World Bank Project Appraisal Document for PELRP, May 2002, 
p.23). Both PIUs stressed in the interviews their good cooperation in 
sharing information and material, but joint projects that could have 
addressed common problems were not implemented due to the political 
tensions at that time. 
 
Though gender is mentioned in the implementation report of the PIU, 
female ex-combatants were neither a special target group of the programme 
nor even distinguished in the data of the overall programme performance. 
With women constituting around 10% of the armed forces in BiH, a closer 
look at their special situation and needs after discharging could have been 
fruitful (Walsh 1997, p.10). Moreover, the social implications of male or 
female ex-soldiers returning to their communities and families would have 
been worth measuring, especially in regard of their impact on gender 
relations. 
 
PTSD still presents a major problem to Bosnian society today with about 
15% of the whole population in Bosnia suffering from different mental 
illnesses related to war experiences (HDR 2002, p.57). Ex-combatants, with 
their experiences on the front lines compose a special problem with 
indications for all parts of social relations and also to their capabilities 
regarding job search and employment in general. With an assessed 41% of 
 43
demobilized soldiers in the EDRP activity mentioned above, it can be 
estimated that a high percentage of all former soldiers are suffering from 
trauma-related problems. Though the PIU in the RS offered PTSD 
counselling and training services to 229 clients, not enough had been done 
on this issue in the EDRP (King 2002, p.11). 
 
In regard to the EDRP, there had been no sustainability, though the PIU 
calculated in their implementation report that a project similar to EDRP 
could have been run successfully by the government of BiH. The PIUs 
argue that circumstances in post-war Bosnia hinder such sustainability 
because economic development has not been stimulated in the same way as 
political structures and bureaucracies (Implementation Completion Report 
BiH EDRP, 2000, p.9). The World Bank itself provided a follow-up with 
the PELRP, targeting a special group of demobilized soldiers who had been 
discharged after the Madrid Agreement (see section on the PELRP). Ex-
combatants from the rapid demobilization of all forces after the DPA are not 
eligible for that assistance. 
 
The World Bank itself saw a shortcoming of the EDRP in not providing 
services for small and medium enterprise development and business skills 
training (World Bank Project Appraisal Document for PELRP, 2002, p.23). 
Instead, a lot of demobilized soldiers were employed in labor intensive 
areas, such as construction work, which often provided only short-term 
employment as long as international donors funded the re-construction of 
the country on a large scale. Long-term self-employment generation was not 
an aim in the EDRP (World Bank Project Appraisal Document for PELRP, 
2002, p.5). 
 
Especially in the Federation, a lot of international NGOs were sub-
contracted to provide services for the EDRP, such as the International 
Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) in the job counselling component. 
Maybe the support and training of local providers could have led to more 
sustainable development of the capacities of Bosnian organizations. 
 
Because of the insufficient degree of cooperation with the MoDs and AFs of 
the entities, there was a lack of information on each ex-soldier in the 
beginning of the implementation period. Moreover, long-term monitoring 
seems to have been neglected. Measurements of the situation of 
demobilized soldiers were taken 120 days after they had been employed, 
following the completion of their one-year-training or job-subsidizing.  
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Lessons Learned 
 
• Cooperation with small private companies was more efficient than with 
large state owned companies. Those companies trained a smaller 
number of demobilized soldiers and employed only half of the trained 
individuals, but these employments were sustainable. The RS turned 
down offers from big state owned companies that wished to take 100 
persons on board without having any work to do at that time; the 
money they would have received by the EDRP was instead planned to 
boost the companies business first without offering any concrete 
placements for EDRP clients (Interview, Z. Miovcic, 14 May 2003). 
Monitoring of contracts that served so many clients was in general 
difficult to achieve in a reasonable way due to the scarce staff resources 
of the PIUs. Nevertheless, a lot of big contracts helped to assist a large 
number of clients in a rapid way.  
• It was often stressed in interviews that SME development is crucial in 
improving the economic and labor market situation in a war-torn and 
post-socialist society in order to establish sustainable economic growth. 
This task proved to be very difficult not only because it was not 
approached enough in the EDRP, but also due to the lack of an 
enterprise mentality in demobilized soldiers in Bosnian post-socialist 
society in general. An overall passive attitude of employees, employers 
as well as government institutions in the labor market hindered even 
better results. 
• Labor market assessment is needed before implementation to make 
DDR projects more efficient. 
• Better monitoring of the project’s outcome is important for follow-up 
and a general assessment of project performance. 
• There was not enough cooperation of the PIUs with the respective 
MoDs, MoLs and AFs in both entities. This could have been a great 
asset in finding and addressing potential beneficiaries for the 
programme. During the first rapid, uncontrolled demobilization of 
military and paramilitary forces after the war, a lot of soldiers were 
demobilized without being kept on file or registered for later 
reintegration activities.  
• The economic situation after the end of the war, and especially the time 
of the EDRP’s implementation from 1996-1999, proved to be very 
receptive in regard to the quick creation of employment. This was 
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mainly due to the high amount of reconstruction aid provided by the 
international community at that time. Without that incentive the EDRP 
would have been less successful (Interviews, Z. Miovcic and D. 
Vuckovic, 14 &15 May 2003). 
 
4.2 Pilot Emergency Labor Redeployment Project (PELRP) 
 
The PELRP of the World Bank was designed to assist the demobilization 
and reintegration of soldiers being discharged following the Madrid 
Agreement (MA) in 1998. In this agreement, the two entities of BiH 
committed themselves to a further reduction of their armed forces by 30%. 
The reduction was implemented in two phases of 15% in the years 1999 and 
2000. The overall objective of these reductions of the armed forces in BiH 
was to improve the situation in regards of budgetary savings of 30% of the 
defence budget, to increase security in the region and to strengthen mutual 
trust between both entities. The PELRP was active since December 2000 
and the first contracts with service providers were signed in early 2001. 
Both PIUs started implementation in June 2001—almost 3 years after the 
Madrid Agreement was approved by both entities. The implementation was 
delayed because the MoDs didn’t provide the soldiers with information on 
the project before they were discharged. Therefore the PIUs spent a lot of 
time on tracking the ex-soldiers, informing them and checking their skills 
and interests for assistance. 
 
The two objectives of the PELRP were: 
 
• To provide ex-soldiers with the means for self-reliant existence and to 
integrate them into the economically active population. 
• To test different labor market measures to encourage employment 
generation and small business creation for the benefit of demobilized 
soldiers and local training and consultancy firms (World Bank Project 
Appraisal Document for PELRP, May 2002, p.3). 
 
It is stressed that the PELRP is demand-driven, therefore being flexible to 
respond to the individual wishes of ex-soldiers. It aims at empowering the 
demobilized soldier to become self-reliant and able to make his/her own 
decision. That is why after a year of implementation the PIUs added another 
component for self-reliance in agriculture after a lot of its potential clients 
had requested such assistance. 
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The total caseload of soldiers discharged in 1999 and 2000 was 12,038 with 
7,384 from the FBiH and 4,645 from the RS armed forces (Bodewig and 
Tomasovic 2002). No data disaggregated by sex was available. The number 
of potential beneficiaries was difficult to measure though both entities’ 
MoDs provided a list with all soldiers discharged in 1999 and 2000. SFOR 
checked that list for potential war criminals before supplying a copy to the 
World Bank and the PIUs. The PIUs had difficulties to determine the real 
number of eligible individuals, because some had already found 
employment, others were pensioners, some were dead, and others had been 
discharged for disciplinary reasons. Therefore, the number of eligible ex-
soldiers was changing and is changing still today, though only marginally. 
So far, 7,926 individuals, 5,021 soldiers from the FBiH and 2,905 from the 
RS (as of fall 2002) have been eligible for the services under the PELRP. 
 
It was outlined in the World Bank Project Appraisal Document that US $ 15 
million would be provided for the PELRP from the International 
Development Association (IDA). An additional contribution of US $ 1.5 
million was to be contributed by the government of BiH and US $ 1.01 
million by the “Dutch Trust Fund”. Almost two thirds of this money would 
be spent in the FBiH, one third in the RS. There is an upper limit of money 
spent per served client in each of the components of the PELRP of KM 
5,000 to 6,000. 
 
The World Bank tried to draw on past experiences on DDR in Bosnia when 
establishing the PELRP. For that reason, workshops with project managers 
from the EDRP and PELRP were organized to inform the PELRP staff on 
lessons learned from the EDRP. In addition, the task team leader for the 
World Bank’s PELRP visited sites of the EDRP in the RS and the FBiH. 
The preparation of the PELRP was perceived to have been quite efficient 
(Interview, Z. Miovcic, 14 May 2003). 
 
As with the EDRP, female demobilized soldiers have not been designated as 
a special target group in the design of the PELRP. No official data about the 
served clients disaggregated by sex is available. Though the Mid-Term 
Review Report of the World Bank acknowledged the possible existence of 
female beneficiaries in the project through the use of the terms “he or she”, 
no section deals with or provides concrete data on this issue (Bodewig and 
Tomasovic 2002). An exception had been the PIU in the RS, where 
disaggregated data was available upon personal request. Female 
demobilized soldiers constituted 11.8% or 557 of all beneficiaries of 
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PELRP activities in the RS as of April 2003 (Interview, J. Rokvic, 15 May 
2003). 
 
 
Institutional Arrangements 
 
As mentioned above, the World Bank tried to maintain the institutional 
memory gained in DDR projects in Bosnia by setting up workshops and 
meetings of PELRP and EDRP staff. This guaranteed that lessons learned 
by the EDRP were taken into account for the new project. As with the 
EDRP, there are separate PIUs for both entities, which differ in some 
aspects. The PIU in the RS is again managed by the Development and 
Employment Foundation (DEF) which has been and is still in charge for all 
World Bank projects in the RS. The PIU in the Federation has been 
established exclusively for the PELRP, the former PIU for the EDRP was 
closed at the end of the project. The governments of both entities nominated 
the heads of the PIUs. Both PIUs work again with extension agents (EA), as 
did the EDRP, to deal with demobilized soldiers in the regions directly. 
There are three EAs covering three regions in the RS, while five deal with 
five regions in the Federation. The EAs are in charge for identifying the 
whereabouts of the ex-soldiers and supplying them with relevant 
information on the project, mostly through announcements in newspapers 
for initial information workshops in the regions. The EAs report monthly on 
the retention of subsidized ex-soldiers. Again, there are some differences 
between the two PIUs. While the EAs of the FBiH cover all components of 
the project and deal with all clients personally, the RS PIU subcontracted 
providers to act as extension agents in the agriculture component because 
they felt that they were lacking the needed capacities and knowledge in that 
field. 
 
Though the PELRP is split as the EDRP between the two entities, both PIUs 
perceived their communication and cooperation as well developed and 
efficient. The representatives of the PIUs meet every second month. 
 
 
Project Components 
 
The World Bank designed two project components for the PELRP: 
 
• Counseling, employment and training 
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• Project implementation 
 
After initiating the PELRP, the PIU made some changes, and with the 
addition of the abovementioned agriculture component, the PELRP 
currently has four different components: 
 
• On-the-job-training and employment 
• Self-employment in agriculture 
• Self-employment in small-scale business 
• Institutional education and training 
 
On-the-job-training and employment: 
In this component companies can take on demobilized soldiers for up to a 
year, providing them with training on-the-job. Salaries are paid by the PIU; 
employers have to pay social insurance contributions and relevant taxes, but 
receive funds for training purposes. The aim of this component is that the 
clients will be retained by the employer at the end of the PELRP-financed 
contract. 
Training and employing of demobilized soldiers in construction work 
Slobodan Stupar, an architect from Banja Luka, founded a construction 
company in 2000. When he heard from the PELRP through a newspaper 
advertisement, he saw it as a chance to train his own future construction 
workers on the job. He had to draft a business plan that was checked and 
agreed upon by the PIU, which then provided him with a list of 300 
potential employees he had to contact. That process took about 2 months. 
From these only 30 responded to his request and finally 9 participated in the 
training. The training was seven hours per day, six days per week, mostly 
practical but with some theoretical lessons. After six months they started to 
work practically on a construction site. The company received KM 5,000 
per ex-soldier, which resulted in a salary of KM 420 per individual per 
month, limited for one year. The company paid the training expenses. 
Slobodan perceived the working discipline of the employees as being very 
low in the beginning. Moreover, the level of drop out was quite high: 
after 3 months 1 left: he was fired because of bad behavior 
after 6 months 4 left: they were not satisfied with the job 
after 9 months 1 left: he found a better job 
Finally, after one year, the company had completed the training of three 
soldiers which were then given a renewed contract, two of them being now 
very good construction workers (Interview, S.Stupar 16 May 2003). 
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By September 2002, 1,510 ex-soldiers were receiving on-the-job-training, 
797 in the FBiH and 713 in the RS. The World Bank’s midterm review 
team (MTR) interviewed a sample of the clients. Most of the ex-soldiers 
were content with this component and expected to have their contract 
prolonged at the end of the PELRP’s assistance, though some were sceptical 
about it (Bodewig and Tomasovic 2002, pp.6-7). There is a general distrust 
of dependent employment with no job security for life. This clearly reflects 
perceptions remaining from the socialist era and also the status they had in 
the armed forces, which now can hinder their flexibility. 
 
There were huge disparities in the salaries paid to the ex-soldiers in this 
component, depending on the entities’ average wages (higher in the FBiH), 
local economic situation, and the companies they’re working for (some tend 
to pay the minimum required salary under the programme). Some have to 
take up an additional job or work in agriculture, mainly on their own piece 
of land to sustain their living conditions. A lot of the interviewed soldiers 
expressed that they prefer the on-the-job-training to receiving a one time 
severance payment by the state when discharged from the armed forces. 
Another observation in this component was that placing ex-soldiers in state-
owned companies is problematic when these companies are not sure to be 
sustainable. Therefore both PIUs tried to focus on small companies which 
could provide better and personalized training. This clearly depends on the 
future economic development in BiH. A growing private sector could boost 
employment. 
 
Though the World Bank’s MTR came to quite optimistic results, there has 
been some scepticism about this component. On the one hand, World Bank 
managers stressed that up to 75% of the subsidized ex-soldiers could keep 
their job after one year. On the other hand, the MoD of the RS perceived the 
breaking up of contracts to be one of the biggest problems in this 
component—either the ex-soldiers just leave the company on short notice or 
the companies fire them due to a lack of working motivations or other 
problems (Interview, M. Cekic 14 May 2003). The example of the 
construction company mentioned above seems to underline that fear. New 
numbers for this component provided by the PELRP in the RS showed for 
the RS only 704 ex-soldiers being employed by the end of April 2003—
which constitutes a reduction of 9 individuals compared to the numbers in 
September 2002 (Interview, J. Rokvic 15 May 2003). That is not a big 
difference, but taking into account that in a period of seven months, not 
only no new employment opportunities were created, but even less people 
 50
were employed, this result is quite critical for the overall performance of the 
PELRP in regard to generating sustainable employment. 
 
Self-employment in agriculture: 
The PELRP project appraisal document did not include such a component. 
As mentioned above, the PIUs saw their initiatives as demand-driven. The 
component was added and active since April 2002 because many ex-
soldiers had expressed the wish to become involved in small-scale farming 
instead of being employed. Under this component ex-soldiers receive 
livestock, technical equipment and counselling to become self-reliant. They 
are obliged to keep the livestock and goods for 6 (RS) up to 12 (FBiH) 
months at a minimum. 
 
The PIUs felt that through this initiative not only individuals but whole 
households could benefit, especially in rural Bosnia where people live in 
extended households with all family members contributing to its 
sustainability. The midterm review team of the WB assessed self-
employment in agriculture to be an important safety net in post-socialist 
Bosnia (Bodewig and Tomasovic 2002, pp.9-12). 
Though the activity has been only implemented since April 2002, it is by 
now the biggest part of the PELRP regarding the number of served clients 
in both entities. 2,207 ex-soldiers received assistance for agriculture by 
September 2002, 1,606 in the FBiH and 541 in the RS. The PIUs as well as 
the MoDs praise this development because it guarantees some income in 
this time of economic stagnation in BiH. The popularity of this component 
largely draws from relevant knowledge of the ex-soldiers regarding farming 
and agriculture. Moreover, as mentioned above, the ex-soldiers prefer to 
work on their own rather than being dependent on one single employer in a 
private business. 
 
Because the programme didn’t differentiate between ex-soldiers in terms of 
income levels, the assistance is of different value to the individual. While 
for some it is somehow the last resort, others saw it as kind of a hobby and 
did not rely at all on the received livestock. Some were able to work at 
another job while the family took care of the agricultural work. In some 
cases, the midterm review team didn’t find the ex-soldier at her/his address. 
Still, misuse like selling livestock immediately on the market happened 
rarely. The quality of the livestock and the bureaucratic procedures to obtain 
it were sometimes criticized.  
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Numbers from April 2003 of the PIU in the RS seem to indicate that a 
majority of ex-soldiers favour this option. Since September 2002, almost all 
new clients were supported for self-reliance in agriculture; the number rose 
in the RS from the abovementioned 541 to now 856. In April 2003 alone, 
there were 35 ex-soldiers assisted in that programme; not one individual 
served any longer in any of the other components. There is some scepticism 
about this approach of the PELRP. While the PIUs argue that in an 
unfavourable economic environment, as in Bosnia at the moment, this 
approach is the only way for demobilized soldiers to earn a living, others 
perceive it to be unsustainable (Interview, Z. Miovcic 14 May 2003). 
Moreover, self-reliance in agriculture does not create any new jobs as the 
other components can. 
 
Self-employment in small-scale business: 
As with the agriculture component, the self-employment in small-scale 
business was added in April 2002, almost a year after the implementation of 
the PELRP had begun. So far, only the RS is providing this assistance to 
demobilized soldiers. Implementation of this part of the PELRP in the FBiH 
is planned but has failed thus far because of the lack of capable providers in 
that area of the Federation (Interview, G. Tinjic  26 March 2003). 
Under this component, ex-soldiers receive the necessary training and 
assistance to set up their own business venture. In addition, they can receive 
goods and equipment for their start-ups. The service provider in the RS is 
the Enterprise Development Agency (EDA) in Banja Luka. The EDA had 
been established by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1998 as 
one of three SME agencies in BiH. By now it has been working 
independently for 2 years. Besides being subcontracted from the PELRP in 
this small component, its main areas of work include business training and 
consulting, capacity building, research, job creation and technical assistance 
to local governments.  
 
In the PELRP, the EDA provides a 7-day advisory course for interested ex-
soldiers in SME and start-ups. After completion of the course, the clients 
have 7 weeks to prepare a business plan, which then is presented in front of 
a panel from the EDA. The business plan, if accepted by the panel, is then 
suggested to the PIU which supports it with KM 4,500. So far, 50 
demobilized soldiers have taken part in this activity. The EDA perceived 
most of the set up businesses as sustainable, with only one clearly having 
failed (Interview, Z. Miovcic 14 May 2003). It is stressed that SME 
development and self-employment in general can not only be sustainable 
but also has the potential to create new jobs when these businesses grow. 
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For the MTR not all of the evaluated businesses in this component gave the 
impression of being sustainable for the future. Sometimes the business plans 
lacked a clear labor market assessment when a business was established in a 
town where a long experienced competitor offered the same service in a 
more efficient way. Other than the agriculture component, SME 
development requires a more complex knowledge that not all demobilized 
soldiers have or are able to obtain in a week-long course. Moreover, the 
amount of money paid by the PIU is not sufficient to set up a business, 
which calls into question that part of the activity. The MTR suggested that 
instead the PIUs should focus on providing the ex-soldiers with the 
necessary skills and then link them to micro-finance programmes. Once 
they have obtained the funds and set up a business, the EDA/PIU could 
assist them with advisory services for one year (Bodewig and Tomasovic 
2002, p.13). 
 
Institutional education and training courses: 
This component provided demobilized soldiers with scholarships to go to 
secondary school, university and other educational institutions to upgrade 
their skills. Though only a small number of ex-soldiers have chosen this 
activity so far, the MTR perceived those who did as being highly motivated 
to reach their goals. By September 2002, 168 ex-soldiers were receiving 
support in this component, 57 in the RS and 111 in the Federation.  
 
While both entities offer well-established educational institutions in terms 
of universities and secondary schools, private training agencies are less well 
developed. The PELRP was able to finance some special courses for ex-
soldiers. Many soldiers decided to improve their language and computer 
skills. 
 
Again, the progress report of the PIU in the RS seems to indicate that the 
demand for this activity is declining. Seven months after the MTR report, 
only two more ex-soldiers have taken up educational training. Though most 
of the demobilized soldiers can offer almost no educational background or 
any valuable skills, a higher participation rate in this activity would have 
been desirable. 
 
 
Achievements 
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The PELRP has already served about 45-50% of the eligible beneficiaries 
from the reduction of the armed forces in BiH in the years 1999 and 2000. 
This is especially impressive regarding the overall economic situation in 
BiH today. A lot of the subsidized contracts in the on-the-job-training 
component have been prolonged—though there has been some doubt about 
the percentage being between 70-75% or lower. 
 
The PIUs identified three times more open positions then were actually 
filled with ex-soldiers. They were not willing to take offered positions. Ex-
soldiers often did not recognize the need to work, the participation in the 
war led them believe that they are entitled to benefits; many are working on 
the black market.  
 
Through self-employment in agriculture assistance, the PIUs were able to 
provide ex-soldiers with an important instrument to rely on and become 
self-sufficient. The MTR, as other interview partners, stressed the 
importance of this activity as a social net in Bosnia because households, not 
just the individual ex-soldier, can benefit from it. 
 
The PELRP is providing important insight into the current Bosnian labor 
market situation and can stimulate institutional reforms. Moreover, it can 
give experiences for future reductions of the armed forces and help to 
facilitate them and improve the public acceptance of military reform and 
reductions. It also tests different labor market measures to encourage 
employment generation and—to a lesser extent—small business creation for 
ex-soldiers. 
 
By focussing on a demand-driven approach, the PELRP allowed ex-soldiers 
to choose for themselves what route they take for employment or self-
reliance. This supported a change of attitude, away from thinking in terms 
of entitlements and the state being responsible for them, to taking initiative 
in their own regard.  
 
 
Shortcomings 
 
There has been some scepticism about the approach of the PIUs to focus on 
supporting demobilized soldiers to become self-employed in agriculture 
(Interview, Z. Miovcic 14 May 2003). This may be an important part of the 
social net in Bosnia, especially in the current economic situation. 
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Nevertheless, it has to be questioned whether or not this approach is 
sustainable in providing long-time income and employment.  
 
It is still not clear how many of the subsidized jobs in the training 
component will be sustainable. Some examples seem to indicate that there is 
a problem in terms of employers cancelling contracts or ex-soldiers leaving 
their jobs before the end of the one-year assistance programme. 
 
The second year of the implementation of the PELRP saw a reduction in the 
variety of chosen assistance by the ex-soldier. By now, the PIUs almost 
exclusively provide support in the agricultural component; all other 
components show no new clients or even decreasing numbers of 
beneficiaries, which stresses again the problem of contracts that have not 
been prolonged. Because the PELRP is demand-driven—what is seen by 
most of the staff and the MTR as its biggest advantage—it can be concluded 
that ex-soldiers no longer show interest in other components of the PELRP.  
 
There is no SME activity under the PELRP in the Federation so far, because 
the PIU has not been able to identify any capable provider for this service in 
the FBiH. Bearing in mind that the EDA in the RS is working quite 
successfully it is not understandable why it should not be also providing its 
services to demobilized soldiers from the Federation. The primary activity 
in this programme takes only a week which could be easily implemented in 
the FBiH. Even the follow-up counselling and monitoring would not create 
problems for the EDA’s capacities as long as the number of applicants is 
about the same as in the RS. The EDA has not been approached for that 
service by the PIU in the FBiH so far, although it would be possible for it to 
provide it (Interview, Z. Miovcic 15 May 2003). 
 
Though the demand is now focussed on the agricultural component, the 
SME activity should be improved in terms of numbers of beneficiaries. It 
has proven that the one-time payment in this component is not sufficient to 
start a business. Therefore the SME participants should be connected to 
organizations that provide micro-finance. 
  
The MoD of the RS saw a problem in terms of eligible persons for the 
PELRP. 12,038 soldiers were discharged after the MA. 7,926 individuals 
were assessed to be eligible for PELRP assistance with 3,885 served by 
September 2002. Though a lot of the demobilized soldiers were either 
pensioners, found a different job, or went abroad, the MoD of the RS holds 
the opinion that about 1,000 of the ex-soldiers of that case-load are “now on 
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the street” and have not even received a severance payment (Interview, M. 
Cekic 14 May 2003). 
 
Identification of laid-off soldiers proves at times to be difficult. The PIUs 
tried to contact many ex-soldiers long after their dismissal, but this was 
difficult. Soldiers were misinformed by the MoD about the PIU services—
allegedly they would receive cash. Soldiers were kept “on hold”, but were 
not informed about their definitive dismissal. There was no pre-discharge 
information about the World Bank’s project which was the fault of the 
Ministry of Defense. While “on hold”, the soldiers were still paid by the 
MoD from three months up to one year—technically, it was possible for ex-
soldiers to receive their military salary as well as support from the PIUs. 
The PIUs had to exclude those soldiers who could actually support 
themselves (Interview, N. Amrudin 27 March 2003). 
 
 
Lessons Learned 
 
• The PELRP and the MoD spent too much time tracking down the 
demobilized soldiers and filtering out the eligible ones. There was no 
information on the PELRP disseminated while the soldiers were still in 
their barracks. Providing the soldiers with orientation and counselling 
courses as well as surveying their skills before the discharge greatly 
improves the implementation of any reintegration project. That is why 
screening of the soldiers while they are still in the barracks is 
important. 
• Because of their low skills and education, demobilized soldiers face 
huge difficulties in the Bosnian labor market. The lack of work habits 
and enterprise mentality, the passiveness and thinking in entitlements 
together with a complaining mood often constitute additional problems 
for a successful reintegration. 
• As with the EDRP, the relationship and cooperation with government 
ministries or EIs at the regional and local level was poor. EIs still lack 
the capacities in job counselling and referral.  
• Employment and training is preferable to a one-time severance 
payment. Future activities should take that into account and train and 
employ demobilized soldiers instead of the government just paying 
them off.  
• The PIUs identified three times more open positions then were actually 
filled with ex-soldiers. They were not willing to take offered positions. 
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Ex-soldiers often did not recognize the need to work; their participation 
in the war led them believe that they are entitled to benefits from the 
state. 
• The economic situation at which the PELRP is implemented is 
completely different to the one at the time of the EDRP’s 
implementation. With less international reconstruction aid provided to 
Bosnia, it was more difficult to support employment in the area of 
construction work, which was a major reason for the success of the 
EDRP. SME development, which is seen as the key to future economic 
development in BiH, is hindered by the lack of foreign and state 
investments, and the lack of options for micro credit schemes (HDR 
2002, p.25). 
 
4.3 IOM Transitional Assistance to Former Soldiers in BiH (TAFS) 
 
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has been involved in 
providing assistance for demobilized soldiers for over a decade in almost a 
dozen countries. The target groups of the TAFS in Bosnia are soldiers and 
civilian personnel who served either with the armed forces or the MoDs and 
concluded their services by April and May 2002. In addition, the 
programme serves soldiers discharged before who have not been assisted by 
other programmes and institutions like the PELRP. This new period of 
downsizing the armed forces resulted out of the threat of bankrupting the 
state of BiH because of the excessive spending of the entities’ AFs and 
MoDs. Defense spending in BiH amounted to 10% of the overall state 
budget (Interview, R. Eaton 16 May 2003). Facilitated by OSCE and SFOR, 
the Joint Military Commission agreed on a further reduction in spring 2002. 
The Federation agreed on discharging 8,936 soldiers out of 22,496 in the 
VF (6,436 Bosniaks and 2,500 Croats). The RS accepted a reduction from 
8,292 to 6,600 (King 2002, p.12). Soldiers were promised by the MoDs in 
RS and FBiH to receive KM 10,000 as a one-time severance payment if 
they would voluntarily agree to end their contract. Most of the contracts had 
been originally signed for four years—there are no life-time positions any 
longer in either of the armed forces. Most of the soldiers left “voluntarily”, 
only 1,500 were forced to leave (Interview, F. Soda  26 & 28 March 2003). 
 
The IOM conducted an information campaign from April to August 2002. 
In November/December 2002 bill boards and posters were placed in public 
transport and other traffic areas with information on the IOM’s 
programmes. During June and July 2002, a radio jingle was aired five times 
per day, for 41 days on 18 radio stations in the FBiH, financed by the 
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British government. Also, posters were sent to all municipal offices, 
employment institutes and offices of the ministries of defense. A second, 
similar, information campaign was conducted in December 2002.  
 
The first interviews with soldiers were conducted in June 2002. After the 
first interview, the former soldier was either referred to a business 
consultant, agricultural consultant, vocational training or given assistance in 
résumé writing, job search and interviewing skills. By January 2003, the 
IOM had registered 3,772 soldiers in the FBiH and 842 in the RS (by June 
2003 registration is now up to 7,200 in BiH). 2,039 were interviewed in the 
FBiH and 161 in the RS. So far, the TAFS has assisted 446 in the 
Federation and 89 in the RS. 
 
The objective of the TAFS “is to facilitate the financial independence of the 
former soldier and to assist them in their transition to the civilian 
community and workforce with as little economic and social disruption as 
possible (IOM TAFS Report, January 2003, p.2).” The project tries to 
achieve this goal by the following activities: 
 
• Profiling, registration, and establishing a database of soldiers who have 
been discharged 
• Information and counseling of discharged soldiers about post-military 
opportunities 
• Enhancing marketable skills 
• Providing trade and agricultural tool kits aimed at sustainable 
employment  
 
Though it is acknowledged in the project report, illustrated by the use of the 
terms “he/she”, that both men and women were and are enlisted in the 
armed forces of both entities and work in the respective MoDs, there is no 
data available in the report for the TAFS which have been disaggregated by 
sex. The IOM report on the TAFS distinguishes only once between male 
and female clients when mentioning employers at a textile company, by 
adding “two of whom a women” in parenthesis (IOM TAFS Report, 
January 2003, p.10). The special situation and needs of former female 
combatants or former female employers of the MoDs in comparison to their 
male counterparts is not the subject of a special targeting approach in the 
design or review of this project. 
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Institutional Arrangements 
 
The IOM project was developed in coordination with the OSCE and donors 
interested in such an activity. It was meant to complement the World 
Bank’s PELRP activities, but because WB did not extend its services to 
soldiers discharged in 2002, The IOM had to expand its programme to 
provide more comprehensive assistance. 
 
The IOM began by determining the regional distribution of discharged 
soldiers and offices were set up respectively in Sarajevo, Mostar, Zenica, 
Tuzla and Banja Luka. The field offices are staffed with IOM programme 
assistants and business and agriculture consultants with experience in 
counseling, economic development and targeted assistance for income 
generation. In areas with a low number of ex-soldiers, The IOM uses the 
premises of Employment Institutes for interviewing and counseling ex-
soldiers (Gorazde, Bihac, Livno). The IOM staff consists of 18 people in 
BiH, including two internationals. In addition, consultants from the IOM—
mostly former USAID co-workers—assess the prospects of small business 
start-ups by making field trips to estimate the likelihood of competition in 
certain areas.  
 
Though there is no complete separate structure as was the case with the 
World Bank’s projects, there are some differences between the RS and 
FBiH. The RS’s army provided access to barracks for the IOM to provide 
pre-discharge information about the programme, whereas the government in 
FBiH was divided. The Croats were quite critical of downsizing while the 
Bosniaks were, for the most part, in favor of it. In July/August 2001 a 
memorandum of understanding was signed with the RS MoD about the 
advance notice of soldiers about their discharge. In RS, the discharge has 
spread over three months; what made the transfer easier than in FBiH where 
all were discharged at once in April 2002. The Soldiers in FBiH received a 
briefing only on the very last day of their service, and were given the 
promise that if the severance payment would not be handed out they could 
return to the AF. Hard-line Croats in the FBiH army and MoD had no 
particular interest in further downsizing due to their political agenda; they 
demonstrated no particular interest in EU Stability Pact assistance. There 
are no significant regional differences in job placement or business start-
ups. Areas engulfed in recession and experiencing a high rate of returns, 
like Central Bosnia or Northwestern Bosnia (Gorazde), where industry is 
down, are hindering successful reintegration.  
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Subcontractors for vocational training are chosen on a competitive basis; 
recognized schools for training are chosen. The IOM identifies schools and 
pays retraining institutions directly, who in turn report back to the IOM on 
the ex-soldier’s attendance and performance. Soldiers were asked to 
contribute to financing the training or education through the KM 10,000 
severance payment they have received, but not all were able to (for 
example, in cases where they had to repay debts). The average per capita 
cost of retraining was 700-800 US$, but not upper limit was ever formally 
declared. IOM covered the funding of reintegration of soldiers discharged in 
RS and FBiH during the years 2001 and 2002. The fundraising is done 
bilaterally. All of the funding has been raised locally with support from the 
OSCE and USAID in the early phases. The main donors of the IOM 
programme are USAID and the governments of Italy, Norway, the 
Netherlands, Britain, and Poland. The case load is not fully funded, and 
OSCE is attempting to raise additional funds. So far, the IOM has received 
only about 20% of the funding that is required for full implementation of 
the TAFS. The IOM itself sees this as the main constraint in the future when 
even more reductions will take place and less funding is available either 
from the entities’ MoDs or the IC (IOM TAFS Report, January 2003, p.12). 
 
The IOM is using the database of PELRP which contains all the names of 
ex-soldiers that participated in that programme to check potential clients 
against it. If a soldier either received or rejected assistance from the PELRP 
s/he is not eligible for TAFS. An exception is the caseload of ex-soldiers 
that fell between the two projects those who had been discharged between 
April 2001 and March 2002. The IOM took an initiative together with the 
OSCE in order to assist these individuals. The communication with the PIU 
of the PELRP is reported to be good, but it is not clear how far the two 
organizations have shared materials and lessons learned from their 
respective projects. There seems to be some overlapping structures and set-
ups, especially regarding the extension agents and experts in the field. 
Closer cooperation, particularly in the field of agricultural assistance, which 
both organizations implement, could have been very fruitful. 
 
As mentioned before, there were some difficulties in the registration process 
for eligible demobilized soldiers. Especially the MoD in the Federation was 
unable to provide the IOM with sufficient advance notice when soldiers 
where discharged. At times, the IOM was notified on discharges only 24 
hours in advance. Still, the IOM was usually able to react immediately and 
deployed staff throughout the FBiH to ensure dissemination of information 
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about the IOM’s assistance. The whole registration process is continuing 
and an increasing number of clients register for support each day. 
 
 
Project Components 
 
The IOM introduced a new activity that has not been applied in the projects 
by the World Bank in Bosnia. All registered ex-soldiers have to attend civic 
education seminars organized by the IOM. The seminars focus on issues 
such as democracy, human rights and civil society, especially in terms of 
reintegrating the ex-soldiers into civilian life. In addition, the “Citizens’ 
Guide to the Government of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” 
produced by UNDP and the Japanese Government is distributed to the 
participants. 
 
Education: 
The education component of the TAFS includes continuing education like 
basic education for those who did not finish school before the war as well as 
higher education at universities, vocational training and courses in IT or 
foreign languages. This is quite similar to the activities provided in the 
respective component of the World Bank’s PELRP. In addition, this 
component includes training which is geared towards the transportation 
sector. This activity, which is supposed to be the most popular aspect of this 
component, provides training to obtain a drivers’ licence for public 
transportation or commercial trucks. Moreover, ex-soldiers can also become 
driving instructors. 
 
Another part of this component is assistance for job searches. The IOM 
wants to strengthen the ex-soldiers’ abilities in résumé writing, interview 
skills, communication techniques, etc. This is facilitated through workshops 
with exercises that are recorded on videotapes for further analysis. At the 
end of the workshop, each client has her/his own résumé, and the IOM will 
then continue to assist the individuals in their job searches. 
 
Thus far, the IOM reports that approximately 37% of all assistance provided 
falls into this activity, which amounts to 198 ex-soldiers being served by 
January 2003. 70 of these are receiving the above mentioned training to 
become driving instructors. IOM expects that these 70 will be hired by the 
instructing school at the end of their training (IOM TAFS Report, January 
2003, p.8). 
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Because some of these educational activities overlap with similar ones in 
the PELRP, it would be interesting to see how far the IOM and the WB 
cooperate in that area. Sharing of information and material could be a great 
asset, especially in regard to the institutions that provide the services for 
both organizations, because well evaluated contractors of the PELRP could 
be beneficial to the IOM’s TAFS. 
 
Trade Kits for Trades and Agriculture: 
The IOM had already foreseen a strong demand for this activity in the 
design of the project. So far, around 43% of all assistance provided falls 
into this section of TAFS. 64% of the ex-soldiers are interested in the small 
business start-up, 36% in agriculture. The IOM in Bosnia has business 
consultants and agricultural experts that help the ex-soldiers to develop their 
businesses. They monitor the outcome and facilitate sustainable solutions. 
In addition, they ensure proper support by the IOM. The main areas in the 
agricultural part of this component are assistance with farming and food 
processing through providing livestock, greenhouses, etc. Similar to the 
PELRP, ex-soldiers receiving this assistance have had previous experience 
in farming and often own usable property or share it with other parts of their 
family. The IOM primarily supports existing activities. Still, the demand for 
this kind of support is lower than in the PELRP. 78 ex-soldiers (1 in the RS, 
77 in the Federation) have chosen it. 
 
151 demobilized soldiers have received assistance in the small-business 
activity, 126 in the Federation and 25 in the RS. It covers a wide range of 
services and sectors. Support is provided to carpenters, auto mechanics, 
electricians, locksmiths, tinsmiths and plumbers, mostly with tools and 
equipment (up to US $ 2,000). There are also business activities like barber 
shops, retail stores and internet cafés which are assisted by the IOM.  
 
Atlantis Coffee, Kladanj 
Zlatko Cular, former soldier, FBiH Army 
Before entering the military, Zlatko Cular worked in a large state-owned 
firm as an administrator. After serving in the army for 10 years, he was 
injured and suffers from chronic back problems, which hinder his 
employment opportunities. When he was discharged in April, Cular and his 
colleagues were informed about the IOM’s TAFS programme. Cular admits 
that he and his colleagues were very skeptical about the IOM programme. A 
friend in Sarajevo had started a successful coffee roasting business and 
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suggested that Cular do the same. Zlatko Cular registered for IOM’s 
programme and began exploring his options with an IOM Business 
Consultant. She agreed that this was a viable business idea. It was agreed 
that IOM would purchase Zlatko a roasting machine, digital scale, and 
coffee grinder, and he would cover the rest of his expenses with the 10,000 
BAM grant he received upon his discharge from the army. In early 
November, Zlatko Cular opened the Atlantis coffee roasting business in 
Kladanj. He supplies coffee to two retail shops in Kladanj and three retail 
shops in the Sarajevo area. He says that his business is growing at a ‘safe’ 
level and that he has already begun to see some profits. In the long term, 
Cular hopes to continue to build his client base and offer other products 
including sweets and baked goods. Cular is currently marketing his 
business, running radio jingles on the local radio station and building his 
client base in the Kladanj area. Cular employs one person and hopes 
eventually to employ another.  
(IOM “Personal Stories”, available at www.iom.ba) 
 
Like in the section on the IOM’s education activities, there is the question 
of cooperation with the respective PELRP components. Sharing lessons 
learned in this process and contracting the same providers for livestock and 
other equipment could lead to some good and synergetic effects. The PIU of 
the PELRP in the Federation could benefit from the IOM’s experience with 
SME development. While the PIU recognized no sufficient providers in that 
area in the FBiH, the IOM seems to have some impressive results with 
setting up small-businesses in the Federation. 
 
Training and Job Placement: 
This component of the TAFS is subdivided into three different areas: de-
mining, fire fighting, and employment in the private sector. In terms of job 
placement, most ex-soldiers established contacts with employers prior to 
retraining. The IOM is contacted by employers who are interested in hiring 
former soldiers or contacts them on its own initiative. The IOM has been in 
contact with 15 employers who could offer jobs for approximately 350 ex-
soldiers. 139 former soldiers are currently employed through this assistance. 
29 of them are employed with de-mining agencies after the IOM provided 
training and purchased de-mining equipment for them. This area of work is 
promising a long-term perspective for employment due to the persistent 
high number of mine fields in BiH. The IOM is thinking about training 40 
more ex-soldiers in this field of work.  
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200 demobilized soldiers will receive training and subsequent employment 
as fire-fighters in municipalities throughout BiH. This activity is supported 
by a British NGO and financed by the British Government. The ex-soldiers 
will be trained in four six-week training courses. The Mayors of the 
respective municipalities support this activity and agreed to employ the ex-
soldiers for at least two years. Besides the training, the British government 
also provides equipment for fire-fighters and their future working stations in 
the municipalities. The side effects of this initiative, therefore also benefit 
the municipalities, which often lack adequate equipment for fire and 
disaster management. Ten municipalities in the Federation and 19 in the RS 
have signalled an interest to receive this assistance. 
 
So far, only 12 ex-soldiers have found employment in the private sector 
through the IOM’s support. Five of them, including two women, have found 
employment with a textile company, three in road construction, two in an 
air conditioning and heating company, and two women are employed in a 
manufacturing company. 
 
The IOM expects that all ex-soldiers receiving assistance will be employed 
upon completion of their training. Secondary qualifications acquired during 
or prior to military service proved to be advantageous for a job placement, 
for example, mechanics, barbers, and cooks. 
Achievements 
 
The IOM succeeded in creating interest and trust for its services with 
demobilized soldiers. Because of the shown effectiveness and sustainability 
of its employment activities, the number of demobilized soldiers registering 
for assistance is rising.  
 
The assistance for SME development seems to be quite successful, and is in 
some cases creating additional employment (see Box 2), which is surprising 
taking into account the current economic situation, the lack of SME credit 
schemes and the bureaucratic problems those businesses face before they 
are finally set up. 
 
The IOM established a better cooperation with the MoDs, AFs and entities’ 
governments than the World Bank’s projects did, enabling a more efficient 
dissemination of project information. In the case of the reductions of the 
RS, the IOM was the first implementing DDR agency in BiH that was able 
to contact and inform soldiers while they were still in the barracks.  
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In the current economic situation and with problems regarding the overall 
funding of TAFS, the IOM’s performance in terms of sustainable 
employment opportunities is quite impressive. The focus on sustainable 
employment instead of short-term subsidizing of jobs seems to be valid, 
especially regarding the appreciation of this by the ex-soldiers and the 
growing positive image of the IOM with the public. 
 
 
Shortcomings 
 
The IOM received only 20 percent of the funding needed for full project 
implementation so far. Given the financial limitations of the Bosnian MoDs 
and the expectation from the IC that another round of reduction will take 
place soon, the continuance of the provision of services for discharged 
soldiers is at risk.  
 
Though an early cooperation with the MoD at least in the case of the RS, 
helped to inform soldiers prior to discharge about the IOM’s project, the 
registration of ex-soldiers has been protracted mostly due to belated 
information of ex-soldiers. 
 
Closer cooperation with the PELRP PIUs, using their structures, extension 
agents and service providers could have created synergetic effects for the 
TAFS. The IOM explained that the use of PELRP structures may be 
possible but that they are too costly for the IOM, because PELRP is using 
too much staff (Interview, F. Soda 26 & 28 March 2003).  
 
 
Lessons Learned 
 
• Elements of the IOM project worth to be considered for transfer: 
Stimulation of self-employment, self-reliance; individualized, needs-
based approach to counseling, financial assistance, supporting business 
start-ups; constant update and cross-checking of data-base; public 
information campaign; close cooperation with chief of personnel in all 
FBiH and RS army garrisons; civic education component.  
• The IOM is contemplating preserving its facilities after the project 
comes to an end, e.g., using them for employment policy in general. 
The existing municipal and cantonal labor or employment bureaus are 
neither transparent trusted or functional. The inexpensive parts of the 
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IOM programme could be technically taken over by the government. 
The IOM is reflecting about possible spin-off effects of the experiences 
gathered in Kosovo, particularly pertaining to the cooperation with the 
Ministries of Labor (Interview, Carl Jenkins 28 March 2003).  
• Future reintegration programmes will have to treat all unemployed 
equally, with no special status for ex-soldiers, yet the soldiers` role 
during the war provides them with a higher societal or political 
backing. Part of overall reintegration assistance should therefore be 
overcoming the psyche of special entitlements.  
• Ex-soldiers usually have only vague ideas about their future business; 
counseling is then provided based on the feasibility of their business 
idea. 
• Often only a few hundred KM are needed to help, without special 
retraining or counseling assistance.  
• Some employers are sympathetic to ex-soldiers, others resent them, but 
there is no general stigma of ex-soldiers on the grounds of work ethics, 
employers appreciate instead their punctuality, discipline, and young 
age, even if the worker is unskilled.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Though the Dayton Peace Accord’s main achievement to end the war was a 
success, some of Bosnia’s main problems of today are related to its 
measurements. This also applies to the demobilization and reintegration 
process. It was a crucial mistake not to include regulations regarding DDR 
into the agreement and not to appoint an international agency to steer that 
process. Though some analysts perceived it as impossible to get the warring 
parties to agree on it during the Dayton talks, the rapid disintegration of all 
military and paramilitary groups following the agreement provides evidence 
against that opinion. With more pressure from the international actors to put 
DDR on the main agenda, post-war Bosnia could have been brought on a 
faster and more sustainable track in that regard. Even Richard Holbrooke, 
one of the key players in Dayton, assumes that one of the biggest mistakes 
was not to disband all armed forces in Bosnia and let NATO be in charge 
for the implementation of it (Dani, 27 June 2003, p.30). Together with the 
OSCE and the OHR a controlled demobilization then could have been 
possible, but NATO—as Holbrooke puts it—was not willing to take up 
responsibilities for it. The international players seemed to have had and still 
have different agendas in Bosnia, which does not enable a fruitful and 
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desirable cooperation (Interview, G. Day 20 May 2003). Still, the 
international community was able to at least implement some helpful 
projects for DDR. The success of these programmes relied immensely on 
the respective economic and political situation and the number of soldiers 
that constituted their target groups. 
 
The first DDR project implemented by the World Bank from 1996 to 1999 
had to struggle with the problematic basic settings mentioned above. 
Nevertheless, it successfully provided assistance to about 23,000 former 
soldiers and helped about 74% of them to find a job. This was mainly due to 
the huge amount of reconstruction aid coming into Bosnia after the end of 
the conflict. It is not clear if the provided assistance led to sustainable 
employment because the situation of the supported former soldiers was 
measured only 120 days after the end of the assistance. It can be estimated 
that a lot of jobs created in areas related to reconstruction were not 
sustained when the international aid began to decrease. A stronger focus on 
SME development could have contributed not only to improve the situation 
of demobilized soldiers but to foster the economic transformation and 
development of Bosnia as a whole. The same accounts for the EDRP’s 
policy to sub-contract international organizations and international NGOs; 
establishing or training of local providers could have produced sustainable 
and autarkic structures for future activities benefiting more groups than only 
demobilized soldiers. 
 
The second and third demobilization and reintegration programmes faced a 
completely different situation than the EDRP immediately after the war. 
The target groups of these two projects were smaller and much better 
defined, which allowed more tailor-made assistance. On the other hand, the 
economic and employment problems of Bosnia during the implementation 
period have made it more complex to create jobs for demobilized soldiers. 
Moreover, Bosnia is attracting less international aid for reconstruction and 
specific projects like the IOM’s TAFS are struggling to receive enough 
funding. Both projects were able to provide assistance to a high percentage 
of their target groups. Though activities included SME development which 
proved to be quite successful, the projects’ focus turned intensively to the 
provision of assistance for demobilized soldiers for self-reliance in 
agriculture. This may help the beneficiaries immediately to secure income 
and improve their situation but some questions have been raised in terms of 
the sustainability of that approach.  
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All DDR projects of international organizations were completely “gender-
blind”, meaning that there was no distinction made between male and 
female former combatants in the project design, implementation and 
evaluation—as far as the received project documents and interviews with 
project managers in Bosnia showed. That one subcontracting agency of the 
World Bank’s EDRP, the ICMC, established a program for female 
combatants didn’t evolve out of strategic and gender aware project 
planning, but was driven from the request of a veteran’s union in Sarajevo. 
It also didn’t lead to an overall gender aware approach by the ICMC in its 
other projects. Estimates say that about 10% of the armed forces in Bosnia 
were female (Walsh 1997, p.10). Not all of them were in combat units, of 
course, but still it is important to acknowledge that female members of 
armed forces encounter different problems when demobilized and 
reintegrated. The special situation and needs of former female combatants 
in comparison to their male counterparts was not subject of a special 
targeting approach in the design of the projects. Data disaggregated by sex 
was available only in one project—and only upon request. 
 
The “social side” to the problem of reintegrating demobilized soldiers was 
not tackled either in the analyzed activities.  The implications that the return 
of former combatants can have on their home communities, families, 
husbands and wives, and gender relations in general can be crucial for the 
success of any reintegration project. Domestic violence is only one possible 
impact that has to be named in this regard. The small activity in the RS with 
demobilized soldiers to work on mental problems uncovered that 41% of 
this group was suffering from PTSD. This small activity doesn’t allow to 
conclude that half of all demobilized soldiers suffer from PTSD, but it 
should have been a alarming sign, which should have led to accurate 
activities dealing with this issue. This illness has a fundamental impact on a 
person’s ability to function in society: to look for a job, to stay employed, or 
just to live with his/her partner or family. A first step to deal with these 
issues could be to include other groups of people in training and counseling 
activities for demobilized soldiers; through such an approach they could 
engage in a social discourse with society again. 
 
Unemployment is high in Bosnia and many people lack confidence in the 
future. As mentioned before, demobilized soldiers constitute one third of all 
unemployed individuals in BiH, also due to the fact that such a high 
percentage of the population as a whole was engaged in combat during the 
war. There are other parts of the population like refugees, displaced persons, 
war invalids, widows—all deserving help and assistance to overcome their 
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problems. But ex-combatants still constitute a special case for Bosnia that 
can be decisive for its future development. As Graham Day, the Deputy 
High Representative to Bosnia put it, “semi-demobilized”, combat-trained, 
unemployed, and traumatized former soldiers especially in rural areas are 
still a security risk for this state and its society, because small arms and 
medium sized weapons are widely available (Interview, G. Day 20 May 
2003). These groups of people are often used by extremists for their 
political agenda, and also have become to, some extent, part of organized 
crime. In particular, they pose a danger to the international communities’ 
effort of enabling minority returns to the two entities (Interview, J. 
Glazebrook, 20 May 2003). 
 
A new way and effort toward reintegrating these people is needed in Bosnia 
and it seems that neither the international community nor the Bosnian 
entities’ governments are really considering this. 
 
 
6. Recommendations for Future Activities 
 
1. Regulations regarding the implementation of DDR measures have 
to be fixed in peace agreements in order to react immediately after 
a conflict before military forces disintegrate. 
2. A holistic vision for DDR is needed which includes the 
participation of military powers or peace-enforcing services (like 
NATO), the different international organizations dealing with 
DDR issues (like World Bank, IOM, ILO, etc.) and respective 
national and international NGOs. National structures (MoDs, 
employment bureaus, etc.) have to be included or build up as early 
as possible. All players have to agree on a concrete agenda. A 
leading agency has to coordinate that process, most likely the UN 
or UN-sponsored structures like the OHR in BiH. 
3. Reconstruction aid is helpful in post-conflict settings, also to create 
short-term employment at a rapid speed. Many demobilized 
soldiers benefited from that approach. Nevertheless, the overall 
goal of any international aid and projects must be to create and 
develop sustainable national structures that can provide 
employment and economic growth. Small and medium enterprise 
development (SME) can lead to added value for the society as a 
whole. 
4. Mental illnesses caused by the war like Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) have to be dealt with immediately after the 
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conflict. Though the main focus needs to be put on the victims of 
the war, ex-soldiers as victims and perpetrators need psychological 
counseling too. With the overall goal of creating security for the 
society as a whole and to increase the prospects of development, 
ex-soldiers with mental problems can be a risky legacy of the war 
that has to be addressed. 
5. Every reintegration activity has to be aware of the implications that 
homecoming soldiers, men or women, can have for their 
communities, families and partners. Often, gender relations have 
changed during a conflict, putting pressure on returning individuals 
and leading to domestic violence. Therefore, a gender analysis—as 
part of an overall situational analysis—is crucial for designing a 
project for demobilized soldiers. 
6. Though the numbers of female soldiers are often low—depending 
on the conflict—every project has to make a clear distinction 
between male and female soldiers because they face different 
problems when demobilized. Right from the start, international 
organizations working in the area of DDR have to make women 
visible. The provision of data disaggregated by sex should be made 
mandatory for every implemented project. 
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